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Equity on the Campus:The
Limits of Injunctive
Regulation of University Protest
Again, it is urged that the desire born of a chancellor's conscience
is 'kinder than the club of the police,' better than 'doubtful re-
sults' in a criminal court. Presently, it will be shown that such
humility is neither wise nor kind, since it begs the most vulnerable
charges against the injunction-that the injunction includes more
than the lawless; that it leaves the lawless undefined and thus
terrorizes innocent conduct .... 1
As the number and vehemence of campus confrontations have spi-
raled upward,2 university administrations have placed increasing rell-
ance on injunctions to quiet the turmoil. In November 1967, the
University of Wisconsin secured a temporary injunction-the first of
its kind-to restrain students from intefering with job recruitment
interviews on the university's Madison campus.3 During the next year
fifty-three injunctions against allegedly disruptive student behavior
were granted to universities4 and, since then, the pace has continued
unabated. As with the fields of labor relations" and civil rights,7
equity, that "gloss written 'round our code,' "8 has acquired a new
look.9
This Note explores what limitations should be placed on the emerg-
ing technique of campus crisis management by injunction. The en-
joining of student protest activities in universities will be viewed from
1. F. FRANmrtmTm & N. G.arMN, TE LABOR INJmorlON 81 (19S0).
2. See getzerally REPOkTr o TnE PRESENT S COitN ON CWsus Ue'Rs 17-49 (1970);
Urban Research Corp., Student Protests, 1969: Summary (1970); Bayer & Austin, Violence
and Disruption on the US. Campus, 1968.69, 84 Enuc. R.coa 846 (1909), J. SnotNuCS,
Tim PoLImCs OF PRoTsT 68-76 (Nat'l Comm'n on the Causes and Prevention of Violence
Staff Report No. 3, 1969).
3. The injunction named as defendants individual students and the Madison Chapter
of Students for a Democratic Sodety. It remained in force for one year, largely forgotten
as the university did not seek a permanent injunction. Interview with George Dunn, past
counsel to University of Wisconsin, Aug. 5, 1970, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
4. Bayer & Austin, supra note 2.
5. See generally URBAN REARCH CORP., ON STME ... Shurr Ir Dowu! A Rnporr oN
TnE Fnhr NAtiONAL SlDEN r STR= M U.S. H=RY (1970).
6. See FkAN FuRTER & GPmN, , supra note 1, at 47-53.
7. See, e.g., Avins & Crutchfield, Prima Fade Tort and Infunctions-New Remedies
Against Sitdowns, 24 GA. BJ. 20 (1961).
8. F.W. MAknI.AD, Ltcruvs oN- EQut" 18 (1909).
9. Addtess by J.P. Holloway, Institute for Continuing Legal Educatlod Conference
on Student Protest and the Law H, Ann Arbor, Mich., Aug. 20, 1970.-
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three perspectives: first, the power of equity to intercede on behalf of
a university administration 0 will be evaluated; second, the extent to
which the First Amendment protects student protests from restraint
by injunction will be described; and, third, the factors which influence
the effectiveness of the injunctive remedy in providing temporary re-
lief from student disruptions will be outlined. On the basis of this
analysis, a series of guidelines for the deployment of campus injunctions
will be delineated.
I. Equitable Jurisdiction
In practice, most universities seeking injunctions have encountered
little or no difficulty obtaining the relief requested," often in a matter
10. The university administration is by no means the only possible plaintiff, Faculty,
students, parents, residents adjacent to the troubled campus, and public prosecutors might
petition for injunctive relief. Since an injunction is available to restrain interference
with contract rights, e.g., United Kosher Butchers Ass'n v. Assoc. Synagogues, 349 Mass,
595, 211 N.E.2d 532, 335 (1965), students and faculty might be able to secure injunctive
relief by characterizing their relationship to the university as contractual. Cf. Paynter v.
New York Univ., 64 Misc. 2d 226, 814 N.Y.S.2d 676 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. City, Small Claims Div,
1970); Wilson, Suits by Students, Taxpayers, and Others Against Institutions Arising Out
of Disruptions in the Educational Processes, 5 COLILEGE CouNsEL 134 (1970). Under proper
conditions an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 might be brought, see Belk v. Chancellor of
Washington Univ., No. FOC 151(1) (E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 1970), 5 CoLLEGE L. BULL. 36 (1971);
cf. Central Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Mo.
1969). But see Asher v. Harrington, 818 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Wis. 1970). Or, all plaintiffs
could proceed on a public nuisance theory, see 4 Po~mRoy, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENCE § 1549
(5th ed. 1941).
In one case to date students and parents have succeeded in obtaining an injunction
restraining other students (at Ohio State University) from creating further disturbances.
Coppeler v. Cohen, No. 240,650 (Ct. C.P., Franklin County, Ohio, June 8, 1970), 2 COLLIE
L BULL. 71 (1970). In another, University of Maryland students secured an ex parle
order forbidding the use of any sound amplifying equipment on campus except by law
enforcement offidals or for scheduled athletic events. Edgar v. Elkins, No. D.4681 (Cir.
Ct. Prince-George County, Md. Sept. 11, 1970), dissolved, No. D-4681 (Cir. Ct. Prince
George County, Md. Sept. 14, 1970), 3 COLLEGE L. BULL. (1970). Public prosecutors
are also showing signs of life. A petition by a county prosecuting attorney to close Kent
State University was summarily granted. State of Ohio v. White, No. 39,346 (Ct. C.P,
Portage County, Ohio May 7, 1970), dissolved, No. 59,346 (Ct. C.P, Portage County, Ohio
June 13, 1970), 2 COLLEGE L. BULL. 71 (1970).
Despite the importance of these trends, attention is focused on the university administra.
tion as plaintiff for two reasons. As a practical matter, universities will probably maintain
their dominant role as plaintiffs in injunction suits against protesting students; and, as
a tactical matter, in view of the need for a sensitive coordinated response to a canpus
disturbance, the university will almost always be the most suitable plaintiff.
11. A case that reveals the readiness of courts to supply injunctive relief is George
Washington Univ. v. Tizer, Civil No. 1590-70 (D.D.C. May 6, 1970). Students in Washing.
ton, D.C., demanded that their school provide facilities for housing demonstrators arriving
in May 1970 to protest the invasion of Cambodia. Despite thc fact that classes had pre-
viously been canceled for the week, it claimed irreparable injury in that [it was] unable
to gain complete and free ingress to said [student union] building in order to perform [sic]the adininistrative officials to carry on the educational process." George Washington Univ.
v. Tizer, Civil No. 1890-70 (D.D.C. May 6, 1970) (Complaint for Temporary Restraining
Order and Other Injunctive Relief), at 4. On the basis of these allegations and a 
reference
to threats to "damage, obstruct, and deny the administration the use of" other btildings,id., the court enjoined, inter ala:
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of hours.'2 Ex parte proceedings for temporary restraining orders
[TROs] are prevalent, 3 and generalized allegations of harm to uni-
versities are rarely scrutinized.14
The apparent ease with which universities have secured court orders
contrasts sharply with the courts' historic preference for noninjunctive
remedies.15 Although the exact boundaries of equity jurisdiction are
not clearly marked,'6 they are drawn, in part, from the redoubtable
maxim that equity will not give specific relief if an adequate remedy
at law is available.'7 If this maxim is to be meaningful in defining the
role of the judiciary in resolving campus conflicts, then injunctive
orders should not be granted except where severe disruption to the
educational mission of the university is imminent.
This limitation on the exercise of equitable jurisdiction follows
from the need for the university, as injunction plaintiff, to overcome
the availability of two major legal remedies for disruptive student
behavior, civil damage suits and criminal proceedings.18 As for the
Entering or remaining in any building on University premises where entry thereto
is unauthorized or has been prohibited to them by the plaintiff .... or where the
University officials have asked them to leave; . . . interfering with the rights of...
others in the performance of their duties . . . ; disrupting, impeding lawful ac-
tivities on University premises; and/or inciting or encouraging others to do any of
the aforementioned acts ....
12. See, e.g., Hearings on Riots, Civil and Criminal Disorders Before a Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 23, at 52071
(1969) (statement of Andrew Cordier, Acting President of Columbia University). Some
university counsel have prepackaged complaints into which only the defendants' names
and threatened acts need be inserted to activate the request for a temporary restraining
order. INsrrtrE FOR CONrNUING LEGAL EDuCATiON, STrDNt-r PRoTEsr A-D TitE LW 152
(G. Holmes, ed. 1969).
13. See pp. 1024-25 infra.
14. See STuDENT PRorrsr, supra note 12, at 149; Note, Campus Confrontation: Resolution
by Injunction, 6 CoLUm. J.L & SOciAL PROB iS 1, 3 n.9 (1970).
15. See H. McClintock, Injunctions Against Sit-Down Strikes, 23 IowA L. REV. 149,
151 (1938).
16. As Professor Chafee noted:
'Equity jurisdiction' has no bright line around it. Its boundaries are as -avy and
confusing as some of those devised by the various schemes for partitioning Palestine.
Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 313 (1950).
17. In holding that a lower federal court erred in enjoining prosecutions under a state
law alleged to violate the First Amendment, the Supreme Court recently reiterated the
limited character of equity jurisdiction and may have enshrined the maxim as a constitu-
tional requirement. Writing for the majority in Younger v. Harris, 91 S. CL 746 (1971),
Air. Justice Black emphasized the force, "under our Constitution," of the "basic doctrine
of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act ... when the moving party
has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable
relief."
18. Other remedies may occasionally be proferred. For example, an action for ejectment
might be brought against trespassers and campus police used to restore order. These
non-injunctive remedies are dealt with in Herman, Injunctive Control of Disruptive
Student Demonstrations, 56 VA. L. REv. 215, 228 (1970). It should be added to Profesr
Herman's discussion of self-help that a few courts may require exhaustion of internal
remedies, i.e., disciplinary action, before granting permanent injunctions. See Holloway
supra note 9; cf. Devito v. McMurray, 311 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. CL, Queens County, 1970).
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first, equitable jurisdiction may nevertheless be proper inasmuch as
interference with the university's educational mission is the type of
injury not susceptible to compensation by way of money damages.10
As in cases of interference with a congregation's use of church property,
not only is the injury all but impossible to quantify in dollars and
cents,20 but the very use to which the property is dedicated is thwarted.1
Accordingly, the requirement that recourse be had to the legal remedy
of civil damage suits has not precluded equitable jurisdiction over
disruptions of religious meetings, 22 and the rationale of irreparable
injury to the institutional mission has been explicitly relied upon
by state courts in defending the propriety of enjoining college pro-
tests .
23
The second legal remedy, criminal proceedings against disruptive
students, should, however, operate as a more substantial impediment
to the exercise of equity jurisdiction. Almost all the campus conduct
for which an injunction might be secured is traditionally subject to
criminal penalty,24 and in addition, 32 states have enacted penal legis-
lation specifically dealing with student disturbances, in many instances
establishing "severe penalties for destruction of school property and
interruption of normal class activity." 25 Furthermore, several jurisdic-
tions have resurrected their riot control laws or passed comprehensive
riot control legislation.26
19. See generally Rosenthal, Injunctive Relief Against Campus Disorders, 118 U. PA. L.
REv. 746 (1970).
20. Herman, supra note 18, at 228.
21. But see note 165 infra.
22. E.g., Gannon v. Action, 303 F. Supp. 1240 (E.D. Mo. 1969). This line of case law
is discussed in more detail in Rosenthal, supra note 19, at 748-50.
23. Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120, 126 (Fla. 1970); Board of Higher Educ, v,
SDS, Queensborough Community College Chapter, 60 Misc. 2d 114, 800 N.YS,2d 983, 088
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969).
24. Arson, assault, breach of the peace, conspiracy, disorderly conduct, false Imprison-
ment, inciting riot, malicious destruction of property, riot, willful interference with meet-
ing, trespass, and unlawful entry are examples of the wide range of conduct that falls
within the traditional ambit of the criminal law. ABA Committee on Campus Government
and Student Dissent, Report 29 (1970).
25. Christian Science Monitor, July 8, 1970, at 16, col. 1. The recently enacted statutes
make it a crime to refuse to leave a building when notified to do so by a designated
offidal; prohibit interference with freedom of movement or use of facilities. punish
"willful disturbance" or conduct that "'impedes, coerces, or intimidates" university per-
sonnel, or "disruptive acts"; make it a felony to enter and destroy records; or prohibit
the possession of firearms of "molotov cocktails" on campus. The usual penalties range
from $500-$1000 fine and 6 months to one year imprisonment. For a state-by-state sum.
mary of the new laws, see STATE oF MI cHIGAN CoMMITm TO INVEsnOATE CAMPUs DIsopmrs
AND Srtmur. UNREsr, Final Staff Report, pt. 2 (1970); Gonzales, State Laws Dealing with
Student Unrest, 1969 (Mimeo., Report to the Office of Institutional Research, Nat' IAssn
of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges).
26. See Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, State and Federal Law on
Riot: A Compilation of Pertinent Statutes, 1969 (available from Legislative Reference
Service, Library of Congress).
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In enjoining conduct that is also the object of criminal statutes,
serious disadvantages are worked upon the defendant which are not
present when the behavior is merely a civil wrong.27 Thus, equity has
historically professed its inability to enjoin a crime.28 The rule is,
however, replete with exceptions, most notably for national emergen-
cies, widespread public nuisances, and specific statutory grants of
power;2 9 but even in its weakened form,30 it continues to induce courts
to refrain from equitable action when criminality is present.3' Ac-
27. Most jurisdictions do not afford the defendant a trial by jury in the action for the
injunction. See generally, Van Hecke, Trial By Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N. C4n. L.
REv. 157 (1953). Disobedience to the court order can result in Imprisonment for contempt
or a substantial monetay penalty unrelated to the harm actually caused to the plaintiff.
Note, Developments In the Law-Injunctions, 79 -ARv. L. REv. 994, 1004 (196). Although
the defendant is entitled to a jury trial if the contempt is a "serious" offense, see Bald-
win v. New York, 899 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 891 U.S. 145 (1968), the jury
does not pass on the facts that gave rise to the underlying dvil controversy, for, iwith
limited exceptions, improper issuance of an iniunction does not constitute a defense.
Developments, supra; see note 256 infra. It denies the defendant the higher burden of
proof imposed on the state in a criminal action, People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, SE0, 118
P.2d 472, 476 (1941); ci. Kean v. Hurley, 179 F.2d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 1950), and, finally, it
may make possible the imposition of a multiple penalty--one for contempt of the in-junction if violated, and another fixed by the criminal law. People v. Lim, supra; People
v. Poe, 236 Cal. App. 2d 928, 47 Cal. Rptr. 670 (Super. Ct. 1965). In the university context
yet two more punishments might be exacted as a result of individual campus dL'd-
plinary procedures, Herman, supra note 18, at 231--2; cf. Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ.,
233 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Fla. 1963); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D.
Tenn. 1961), and general federal scholarship termination provisions, see Note, Federal did
to Education: Campus Unrest Riders, 22 SrAu. L. Rxv. 1094 (1970); Note, Campus Con-frontation: Resolution by Legislation, 6 COLum. J.L. & SoctAs. Priont. hs SO (1970).
28. See generally Mack, The Revival of Criminal Equity, 16 HAv. L. Rxv. 389, 191-92
(1908).
29. See United States v. Jaas, 409 F.2d 358, 860 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that outside
these three areas equity is without jurisdiction to enjoin criminality). But see note 32
infra. At least one state has provided a specific statutory grant of power by enacting legis-
lation under which the head of an institution of higher learmng can seek injunctive
relief in the event of a campus disorder. See GE.N. STAT. N. CAR, 14-288.18 (199. To the
extent that legislation in this realm might be useful, a statute should follow the model
proposed by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, "autho-
ring universities, along with other affected persons, to obtain court injunctions against
willful private acts of physical obstruction that prevent other persons from exercising
their First Amendment rights of speech, peaceable assembly, and petition for the redress
of grievances," NAT'L COMWsN ON THE CAUSES AND PmErroN OF VIoLExcE, To EsrAnhsit
JusTIcE, To ENUsm DoMmsriC TRANQUILrrY 216 (1969).
30. Criminal acts are sometimes said to lie on the "periphery of injunctive power."
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 18, Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388
U.S. 807 (1967).
31. See, e.g., People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 118 P.2d 472 (1941); cf. United States v.
Jalas, 409 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1969); Bass Angler v. U.S. Steel, 2 ENVIm. RP,. 120-1 (S.D. Ala.
1971). But see note 82 infra.
To avoid the additional burden imposed by the presence of criminal sanctions, the uni-
versity may argue that the criminal remedies are themselves inadequate, being too trivial
to deter the defendant. See cases cited in Developments, supra note 27, at 1016 nn. 200.02.
However, the expansion and stiffening of the criminal laws pertinent to campus disorders,
see p. 990 supra, should make it more difficult for the university to secure relief.
Adequacy of the criminal laws may also be attacked if the private party has no control
over the initiation of a criminal action or if a jury ould refuse to convict out of a n
aversion to the substance of the criminal law, Developments supra, at 1016. Howevcr,
public prosecutors have shown no reticence in pressing charges against dissident students,
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cordingly, to satisfy the criminality doctrine, the disruption must be
serious enough to rise to the level of a widespread public nuisance.
Yet, when it comes to issuing an injunction against dissident students,
the courts appear to abandon the limiting principles of equity jurispru-
dence imposed by the availability of civil damage actions and criminal
proceedings. For example, one New York court went so far as to main-
tain "[w]hether or not the act sought to be enjoined is a crime is im-
material." 32 Similarly, almost any potential harm to the university
tends to be termed "irreparable," so that another New York court
summarily dismissed defendants' suggestion that because the classes
usually conducted in the one building being occupied on the campus
could easily be scheduled to meet in a nearby building, the allegation
of irreparable injury was deficient. 3 Indeed, one court not only re-
fused to acknowledge that criminality might impede the exercise of
equity jurisdiction, but also perceived irreparable injury in the prospect
of a peaceful and orderly student meeting involving no interference
with any scheduled university activities.34 In contrast to the present
practice, the historic preference for civil actions at law and the cor-
relative distaste for enjoining criminally punishable conduct should
require that to secure an injunction, the interference with the educa-
tional mission of the university be crippling. Isolated incidents and
revolutionary rhetoric should not suffice. The crucial inquiry is not
even whether some disruption is imminent, but rather whether the
disruption is of such magnitude as to make it impossible for the uni-
versity to continue its education services. In each case the determina-
tion should rest on such factors as the number of students involved,
in some cases proceeding without the request or consent of-and sometimes even against
the wishes of-the university administration. See, e.g., STUDENT PROTEST supra note 12, at
135 (charges brought against students at Brooklyn College and Cornell University with.
out consent of schools); Hearings on Riots, pt. 22, supra note 12, at 4820 (Vorhees students
arrested over objections of college president).
A few other arguments might be used by a university in an effort to stimulate emis.
sion of an injunction when the quantum of disruption is smaller than that described
in the text. It could allege that a multiplicity of suits at law would be required to al-
leviate the effects of a continued trespass or intermittent disruptions. See Pomrmoy', supra
note 10, at 1357; cases cited, Campus Confrontation, supra note 14, at 2 n.7. Also,
insolvency of defendants, although not in itself generally sufficient to justify an In-
junction, may be relevant. See id. at 2 n.8. Factors like these, however, relate only to the
adequacy of the civil remedy and do not overcome the problems inherent in enjoining
criminality.
32. Board of Higher Educ. v. SDS, Queensborough Community College Chapter, 60
Misc. 2d 114, 119, 300 N.Y.S.2d 983, 989 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969), quoting People
ex rel. Bennette v. Laman, 277 N.Y. 868, 376, 14 N.E.2d 439, 442 (1938). See also Note, 28
FORDHIAM L. Rav. 161, 162 (1959).
88. Board of Higher Educ. v. Rubain, 62 Misc. 2d 978, 810 N.Y.S.2d 972 (SUp, Ct, Broulx
County 1970).
34. Ieberman v. Marshall, 286 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1970).
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the conduct exhibited or threatened, and its probable duration.o For
instance, remaining in the student center after dosing hours to con-
tinue a meetingz6 should not elicit the same response as seizing the
computer center 7 or administration building.3
In sum, for injunctive relief to be proper, the offensive conduct
must be such as to force cessation of at least some teaching or research
activity on more than one occasion or severely interfere with other
university functions for a prolonged period;39 however, protest that
is only sporadically disruptive or affects only nonessential operations
should not be stayed by the hand of equity.4 Recourse, if any, should
be to other remedies."
II. First Amendment Protections
The trend toward restraining student protest by injunction should
be curtailed not only by traditional tests as to when equity may act,
but also by a concern for the rights of students to express their ideas
and opinions freely and vigorously.t To analyze the use of campus
35. Campus Confrontation, supra note 14, at 28; cf. Rosenthal, supra note 19, at 751-
52. But see Herman, supra note 18, at 228.
36. See Cholmakjian v. Board of Trustees, 315 F. Supp. 1335 (%V.D. Mich. 1970).
37. See Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 318 F. Supp. 608 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
38. Cf. Campus Confrontations, supra note 14, at 28 n.111. Likewise, occupation of a
single classroom building may prove inconvenient but may not involve nearly the injury
associated with the conversion of, say, the entire science wing, laboratories and lecture
halls alike. Where classes or other activities, like job recruitment interviews, can easily
be rescheduled to another building, there can be no irreparable injury to the university,
students, or faculty. But see Board of Higher Educ. v. Rubain, 62 Misc. 2d 978, 310
N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1970). But interference with a unique educational
facility, such as the political science library or the physics laboratory, is necessarily more
serious. On occasion, the non-substitutable nature of the facility may be preent onl)
with respect to certain uses. For example, the school auditorium may be essential to
accommodate the large audience expected at commencement exercises, but not for a series
of poorly attended lectures. Cf. Fordham Univ. v. King, 63 Misc. 2d 611, 313 N.Y.S.-d 208
(Sup. CL Bronx County 1970).
39. That is, three elements determine the seriousness of the disruption. One is how.
crucial the facilities being interfered with are to the functioning of the university as an
academic institution; the second is how complete the interference is; and the third ib
how long the interference can be expected to last. Cf. Scott v. Alabama State Board of
Educ., Civil No. 2865-N (M.D. Ala. May 14, 1969), reprinted in STuDL%T Prorsr, suput
note 12, at 315.
40. These guidelines are intended to delineate a threshold below which disruption
of university operations does not constitute an enjoinable offense. Once it is proved that
a disturbance whose proportions bring it above the threshold is imminent, the court
should frame its decree to afford adequate relief even if this entails enjoining an act
which, taken alone, would not warrant equitable intervention. But cf. Lorain Journal Co.
v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 156 (1951).
41. For an outline of the remedies available to the university, see 0. Williams, The
University's Remedies, in Handling Student Demonstrations, in Tim CMiPcs CRIsIs Rz-
vissrm 11 (Practising Law Institute 1970).
42. This sentiment is often forcefully espoused in academic and judicial circles. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional
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injunctions in First Amendment terms entails determining, first, what
forms of protest constitute "expression" cognizable by the First
Amendment, and, second, to what extent public universities8 can
regulate activity so classified by injunctive prior restraints44-a mode
of control "bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity." 4t
freedom is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools." Shelton V.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960), quoted in Keyishian V. Board of Regents, 885 U,S. 589,
603 (1967).
The general public, however, is less certain, as revealed in a recent Harris poll which
found that 52 per cent of the American people believe that students should not have th
right to protest-peacefully or otherwise. PMSiDENT'S COMbt'N, supra note 2, ht 219.
43. The extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment constrains the actions of private
universities with regard to admissions policies, disciplinary procedures, and control of
student expression is not yet settled. See generally O'Neil, Private Universities and Public
Law, 19 BUFFALO L. Ray. 155 (1970). In some cases courts seem to have implicitly as-
sumed the applicability of the First Amendment, though this probably results from mere
omission rather than any studied conclusion. See, e.g., Nat'l Strike Information Center v.
Brandeis Univ., 315 F. Supp. 928, 930-31 (D. Mass. 1970). Clearly public universities, as
instrumentalities of the state, are fully bound by the First Amendment as incorporated
into the Fourteenth. On the other hand, although the concept of state action has shown
itself to be highly ductile in other contexts, private universities have been able to
insulate themselves from the First Amendment. See, e.g., Post V. Payton, 39 U.S.L.W.
2437 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1971). Accordingly, the First Amendment analysis which Is
developed in the text can be said to apply with certainty only to public institutions.
Nevertheless, at least six theories are available to read state action into the operation of
private universities. Cf. Note, Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 lAtv.
L. REv. 1045, 1056-61 (1968). First, they may be identified with the state by the receipt
of government funds. This government financing theory has, however, not fared well when
offered with respect to disciplinary proceedings in private universities. See, e.g,, Brown v.
Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cit. 1969); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Note, An
Overview: The Private University and Due Process, 1970 DuIE L, REv. 765. Second,
private universities may be linked with the state through increased legislative control
exerted in response to campus unrest. See Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120
(2d Cir. 1970); O'Neil, supra, at 180-81, 184.86. But see McLoed v. College of Artesia,
312 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.M. 1970). Third, if, as is often true, campus police possess the
power of arrest, their warnings to demonstrators may establish state action. Cf. Tanner
v. Lloyd Corp., 308 F. Supp. 128, 131 (D. Ore. 1970); Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping
Center, 478 P.2d 792, 794 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970). Fourth, the state's imprimatur In the
form of an injunction may, ipso facto, constitute state action. This theory is, of course,
supported by the problematical case of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), but It Is
also implicit in the Supreme Court's deision in Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1967) that "the State may not delegate the power,through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude members of the public witing to
exercse their First Amendment rights......Id. at 319. But c. Evans V. Abney, 396U.S. 435 (1970); Note, Restricted Scholarships, State Universitie and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 56 VA. L. Ray. 1454, 1463 n51 (1970). Fifth, if the lne of case simlar toLogan Valley are read to stand, instead, for the rather metaphysical proposition thatprivate property owners engage in "state action" by allowing their property to become
"functionally equivalent" to municipal property, then the private university, like the
company owned town in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1945), should discover its rightsns a private property owner "circumscribed by the . . . Constitutional rihts of those
who ustea ne 115 supra Sixth, on an analogous perspective, educationitself may be perceived as a public function, and the action of the educational instittion
equivalent to that of the state. See Belk v. Chancellor of Washington Univ., Civil No,
70-C-151(1) E.D. Mo. Nov. 25, 1970), 3 Cou.ro L. Bu.. 36 (1971); O'Nei , supra, at
176-79.
44. A contempt citation is a subsequent punishment only in the Sense as is any penaltyexacted for. disobedience of a prior restraint,
45. Bantam nooks, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963), See also C.O.v.E. v, Burt
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A. The Limits of Expression
In this section, campus protest will be examined in terms of the
action/expression dichotomy as a prerequisite to ascertaining when
First Amendment protections are operative.40 While campus demon-
strations are complex phenomena composed of many individual acts,
some of which will be shown to be "expression," and other, "ac-
tion," injunctions whose scope is restricted to controlling the ele-
ments that are determined to be "action" are governed primarily by
the constraints of equitable jurisdiction.47
In classifying the forms of campus protest, a general investigation
of the problem of "symbolic speech"48 will not be undertaken. In-
stead, following the cases in which college protests have attracted the
attention (and frequently the ire) of the courts, it will be assumed
that even in circumstances where conduct which would othenise be
"action" is undeniably "symbolic" and charged with meaning, it is not
thereby transformed into "expression." 49
The courts have unhesitatingly declared that whenever demonstra-
tors damage persons or property or physically obstruct normal
university operations, they forfeit any First Amendment protections
which might otherwise be afforded to them.50 Condemnation of acts of
violence, even those undertaken as an integral part of the protest, is
unanimous.51 Indeed, the barest minimum of violence on the part of
318 F.2d, 95, 102 (5th Cir. 1963). But see P. FREuND, THE SuP EPM CouRT OF "tE UNTmED
STATs 69-74 (6th ed. 1967).
46. For a comprehensive effort to classify conduct about which First Amendment
litigation has centered, see T. E~emsON, THE SysrE oF FEm=oNt oF ExP'sxoN (1970).
47. See pp. 988-93 supra. The First Amendment does require that even injunctions
against protest classified as "action" be obtained, with limited exceptions, through an
adversary proceeding. See pp. 1024-25 infra.
48. See generally Note, Symbolic Conduct, 60 COLrMr. L. REV. 1091 (1968).
49. Cf. Kaufman, The Medium, the Message, and the First Amendment, 45 N.Y.U. L
R-v. 761 (1970).
50. Since this Note deals only with how traditional First Amendment protections
should apply on campuses, no inquiry will be made into whether acts of "civil dis-
obedience'--violent or otherwise-deserve legal protection.
51. Fairly representative of the judicial attitude, a federal district court in Ohio
declared in the most obiter of dicta:
While the constitution guarantees a right of peaceful assembly and the right to
petition, it does not condone violence or the destruction of public or private
property.. . .Those individuals who violate the law by burning, bombing, and
destroying are, and should be, subjected to prosecution for their acts.. .. While
thfose students who disagree with the policies of others have a constitutional right
to advance their positions, they have no right to bomb, burn, and interfere with the
rights of the vast majority who attend our universities in the pursuit of an education.
King v. Jones, 819 F. Supp. 658, 662 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
The following actions have been judged "conduct by students ... obviously constitu-
tionally subject to severe sanctions .... " Mfarzette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 502, 569 (W.D.
Wis. 1968): breaking windows, see, e.g., Locke v. Vance, S07 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969);
slashing fire hoses and stealing food and typewriters, Board of Higher Educ. v. Marcus, 63
Misc. 2d 268, 311 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. CL Kings County 1970); damaging furniture, see Mar-
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the demonstrators suffices to transport their dissent beyond the pro-
tective aegis of the First Amendment.52
Similarly, acts of physical obstruction have been treated as "action"
subject to injunction or punishment rather than "expression" po-
tentially protected by the First Amendment. The obstructive behavior
can take many forms5 a but always involves conduct by the demon-
strators that physically interferes with normal university operations."4
In particular, most of the physically obstructive campus demonstra-
tions have centered around interference with the movement of per-
sons, 5 but many have also included forcibly taking control of campus
facilities.56
zette v. McPhee, 294 F. Supp. 562 (W.D. Wis. 1968); banging on doors with "large objects,"
Board of Higher Educ. v. Rubain, 62 Misc. 2d 978, 310 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1970); burning buildings, see, e.g., Cholmakjian v. Board of Trustees, 315 F. Supp.
1835 (W.D. Mich. 1970); breaking into locked offices, Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ. 318 F.
Supp. 608, 612 (M.D. Pa. 1970); dumping and rifling through files, and burning faculty
research, see Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
and forcing school officials out of their offices, Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., supra, or
holding them captive, see Marzette v. McPhee, supra, Grossner v. Trustees of Columbla
Univ., supra. See also Barker v. Hardway 283 F. Supp. 228, 238 (SD.W.Va.), aft'd, 899 F.2d
638 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969).
52. The incidents of violence in Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 290 F. Supp.
622 (W.D. Mo. 1968), affTd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970),
led the district court to declare without reservation that an educational institution can
protect itself against "conduct that would damage or destroy it or its property in toto
or in part." 290 F. Supp. at 629. This broad rule that violent tactics are outside the
First Amendment and, therefore are amenable to injunction is consistent with the
cautious, if not timid, dicta of the Supreme Court in the symbolic speech cases, see Street
v. New York, 894 U.S. 579 (1969);.Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 398
U.S. 503 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 867 (1968), and with an earlier decision
upholding an injunction against labor picketing where a background of violence "tainted"
the record, Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
53. Perhaps the most imaginative obstructive demonstration occurred entirely outside
the college context. In United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1962), protestors In
a rowboat blocked a submarine launching.
54. In this sense it is to be distinguished from peaceful conduct that may also impede
normal university functioning. Noise, the waving of placards, the presence of large
numbers of people, and other inevitable accoutrements of any mass demonstration do
not constitute "obstruction" as that term is used here. Even in situations where these fac-
tors do disrupt classes, school meetings, etc., they do not displace a demonstration
outside the "expression" category, see pp. 997-98 infra, though protest that is nonviolent
and nonobstructive but is nevertheless disruptive does require special treatment, Sc
pp. 1000-19 infra.
55. Examples are plentiful and include: blocking the entrance to the student center
at Fordlham University to prevent attendance at an ROTC luncheon, Fordham Univ. v.
King, 63 Misc. 2d 611, 813 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1970), linking arms to
prevent attendance at placement interviews at Colorado, Buttney v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp.
280 (D. Colo. 1968), "crowding" in front of the Marine Corps booth at Michigan State's
Career Carnival, People v. Harrison, 883 Mich. 585, 178 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1970), and
chaining and barricading (with "metal art objects") the entrances to buildings at the
City University of New York, Board of Higher Educ. v. Rubain, 62 Misc. 2d 978, (Sup,
Ct. Bronx County 1970) (violence also present).
56. See, e.g., Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 318 F. Supp. 608, 612 (M.D. Pa. 1970);
Seymour v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 313 F. Supp. 554 (W.D. Va. 1970). Building "seizures"
should not be confused with the more traditional "sit-ins." While both entail remaining
within a building against the wishes of the proprietor, the sit-in does not necessarily
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Inclusion of physical obstruction, along with violence, in the "ac-
tion" category is justifiable," for these activities always entail im-
mediate harm which cannot be alleviated except through direct
control of the offending conduct.53 However, in concluding that acts
of violence and physical obstruction are always "action" rather than
"expression," it must be emphasized that an outbreak of such con-
duct should not suffice to condemn a demonstration in toto. The
temptation to label an entire demonstration "violent," or worse, "ag-
gressive,"' 9 and, for that reason, beyond the protection of the First
Amendment should be staunchly resisted. For instance, the rule an-
nounced by the district court in Esteban v. Central Missouri State
CollegeG0 should allow steps to be taken against the egg-throwing,
car-rocking demonstrators who were penalized, not for being part of
an entity known as a "violent demonstration," but simply for re-
sorting to specific acts of violence. Precision in this matter is especially
important in view of the nature of equitable remedy. The problem
of speech "brigaded with action"' 1 is actually less severe in connection
with restraint by injunction than in other contexts, for a court order,
unlike a cloud of tear gas, can be confined to counter "action" with-
out impinging on protected "expression."0 2
While violence and physical obstruction are "action," most other
forms of campus protest are "expression," the regulation of which is
governed by the First Amendment.03 For example, in Brown v. Louisi-
deny continued use of the building to the usual occupants. A "seizure," ... takeover,"
"occupation," or "liberation," on the other hand, always does. As a result, while
seizures are generally regarded as "action," see EMERSON, supra note 46, at 293, sit-ins are
more appropriately classified as "expression," see pp. 997-98 infra.
57. Lower courts frequently rely on United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1963),
the draft card burning case, in rejecting attempts to characterize campus occupations
as symbolic speech. E.g., Scott v. Alabama Board of Higher Educ, Civil No. 2865-N
(M.D. Ala. May 14, 1969), reprinted in STUDENT PROTEST, supra note 12, at 315; Hutt v.
Brooklyn College, No. 68-C-691 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1968). O'Brien, however, assumed,
arguendo, that the burning tvas expression, 391 U.S. at 376, and proceeded to introduce
a weighted balancing test to justify penalizing the conduct, id. at 377. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 577 (1965).
58. See T. EDAERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE Fiwsr A3aMNDENzr 61 (1966).
Furthermore, the rule that physical obstruction is "action" no matter how essential it
may be to the protest is in keeping with the Supreme Court's per curiam dismissal
of certiorari as improvidently granted in the obstructive picketing case of Taggart v.
Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970) as well as its ready acceptance of the Mississippi
anti-picketing law challenged in Cameron v. Johnson, 380 U.S. 611 (1967).
59. See Barker v. Hardway, 394 U.S. 905 (1969) (denying cert.).
60. See note 52 supra.
61. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J. concurring).
62. It will be shown that as a consequence, an injunction cannot be used as a prior
restraint against the occurrence of a demonstration for fear that the protest will
consist of expression interlaced with action. See pp. 1001-03 infra.
63. Of course, in the absence of a full protection test for expression, this does not
mean that all nonviolent and nonobstructive protest is actually protected by the First
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ana,64 the Court overturned the conviction of a group of Blacks who
had remained in the segregated reading room of a public library over
the librarian's objections. After reiterating the language of the First
Amendment, the opinion subscribed to by the largest number of
majority Justices stated:
[T]hese rights are not confined to verbal expression. They em-
brace appropriate types of action which certainly include the
right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and
reproachful presence . ... 5
As the opinion emphasized, marching, carrying signs, leffleting, mak-
ing speeches, sitting-in, and the like, if done nonviolently and non-
obstructively, are historic First Amendment activities.00 Furthermore,
they remain expression rather than action even if executed in the
midst of a hostile audience67 or in a place not suitable for demonstra-
tions. 6
B. The Limits of Injunctive Regulation
Exclusion of violent and physically obstructive forms of protest from
the definition of "expression," although consistent with the case law,
represents a relatively conservative theory of the scope of the First
Amendment. 9 If this theory is to be effective in protecting and en-
Amendment. Three types of speech which the courts have been reluctant to protect are
advocacy of criminal acts where there is a likelihood the act will occur, see, e.g., Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), "fighting words," see, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942), and obscenity, see, e.g., Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Such speech,
it has been argued, should be considered "action" rather than "expression." See ENsrstON,
note 46 supra.
64. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
65. 383 U.S. at 141-42. There was no majority opinion in the case. Mr. Justice Fortas,
joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas took the position that there
was no evidence to support a conviction of breach of the peace. Mr. Justice Brennan
concurred, on the grounds that the statute was overbroad, and Mr. Justice White con-
curred, for the reason that the protestors "were making only a normal and authorized
use of the library." Id. at 151.
66. 383 U.S. at 142 n.6. But ef. Cogwill v. California, 396 U.S. 371 (1971) (dismissing
appeal); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 579 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 307
(1968).
Within this category, however, the Court, in talking of "speech pure," "speech plus,"
and conduct "akin to 'pure speech,' has spawned a confusing set of subdivisions. See
generally Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, 80 HAIv. L. REv. 1773 (1967).
67. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969), stating in dictum, "Petitioners'
march, if peaceful and orderly, falls within the sphere of conduct protected by the
First Amendment."
68. In Sword v. Fox, 317 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Va. 1970), the district court was con-
fronted with a peaceful sit-in in violation of a rule against political demonstrations In
campus buildings, and after emphasizing the nonviolent and nonobstructive aspects of
the demonstration, concluded that "the conduct of the students sought to be punished
amounted only to protected expression." Id. at 1067.
69. See Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. 444, 451(1969).
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couraging protest, regulation of that conduct which is "expression"-
the nonviolent and nonobstructive modes of protest-must be care-
fully circumscribed.
1. Contemporaneous Orientation: Enjoining Action
For analytic purposes, campus injunctions can be separated into
two parts: those portions that seek to terminate contemporaneous
activity and those that restrict future conduct.70 The First Amend-
ment consequences of the orders depend strongly on which of these
two orientations is utilized. While it is theoretically possible that a
university might attempt to enjoin a perfectly peaceful demonstration
after its inception,7' this does not appear to be a practical problem. 2
In virtually every case in which a university has secured an injunc-
tion to terminate an ongoing student demonstration, the conduct of
the protestors could be characterized as violent or physically obstruc-
tive.73 Typical of decrees of this genre are the provision of a TRO
"order[ing] and direct[ing] [defendants] to vacate the [old Student
Union building] forthwith.. ."7 and the segment of a temporary in-
junction prohibiting "[o]bstructing the entrance and exit of any per-
sons to or from Parkhurst Hall .... ,,7 Inasmuch as these orders
usually control "action" rather than "expression," 70 they are subject
to no obvious constitutional challenge.77
70. The compartmentalization of injunctions into "contemporaneous" and "pro-
spective" elements is not watertight. When the disturbance takes the form of the
intermittent harassment, such as periodic mill-ins in randomly selected offices, or when
acts of violence are sporadic but persistent, whether an order enjoining the tactic pro-
scribes present or future conduct is not altogether dear. Nevertheless, in the Nast
majority of cases, the division is a useful one.
71. It might, for instance, allege that a hostile audience had gathered about a speaker,
creating an imminent danger to the continued operation of the university. Cf. Trustees
of Dartmouth College v. John Doe, No. 10795 (super. Ct. Grafton County, N.H. May 6,
1969) (Petition for Injunction).
72. Nor, given the logistics of obtaining injunctive relief, is it likely to become one.
For example, if a university objects to the presence of an outside speaker on campus, it
might attempt to ban him in advance of his arrival, see cases cited note 82 infra, but
the probability that it will rush to court to obtain a TRO to serve upon him after he
has begun speaking is negligible.
73. See, e.g., cases cited, notes 55-56 supra.
74. George Washington Univ. v. Tizer, Civil No. 1390-70 (D.D.C. May 6, 1970).
75. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. John Doe, No. 10795 (Super. Ct. Grafton County.
N.H. May 6, 1969).
76. Unfortunately, as a result of imprecise terminology, the orders are often not
confined to "action." For example, a state court in Pennsylvania granted an ex parte
temporary injunction restraining ten named students and forty John Does from "[o]bsiruct-
ing, hindering or attempting to obstruct or hinder, in any manner, whether or not
overt force or violence is committed or threatened to be committed, any person or per-
sons from free ingress and egress to said Shieds building or any other premises or
property of the University. See Sill v. Pennsylvania Ste U Univ., 318 F. Supp. 608, 611-12(MD. Pa. 1970). Whether this order is, by its terms, restricted to ph)ia1y obstructive
and violent behavior is far from apparent.
77. The fundamental problem posed by these orders lies in deciding at what point
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2. Prospective Orientation: Enjoining Expression
Unfortunately, campus injunctions are rarely limited to contempora-
neous conduct. Understandably, they are also concerned with future
student protest, and those portions of injunctions which are fashioned
to operate prospectively are, more often than not, gravely afflicted with
constitutional infirmities. In Colorado, for instance, students were
enjoined from so much as "entering any academic or administrative
building.., for the purpose of conducting any demonstration, protest
or remonstrance,"' s while in New York, Queens College students dis-
covered they could not assemble in the vicinity of any campus build-
ing without prior approval from the president or a dean. 0 These
decrees are not isolated abberrations; rather, they are representative of
the manner in which protest conduct not yet underway at the time
of issuance of the order is enjoined. As they reveal, the prospectively
oriented portions of campus injunctions tend to ban conduct well
within the First Amendment sphere as well as violent or obstruc-
tive activities beyond its effective radius. As a consequence, problems of
prior restraint, vagueness and overbreadth are ubiquitous in the pro.
spectively oriented relief.
a. Prior Restraints. The prior restraint doctrine 0 substantively
circumscribes the issuance of injunctions8l in that it precludes the
"expression" becomes "action." Under almost any definition of these terms, numerous
borderline situations will inevitably arise. Beyond the effort to characterize the conduct
prohibited as "expression," the substance of the orders might be impeached, if at all, on
the basis of their chilling effect on other, protected, conduct. See Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479 (1965). But see Cholmakjian v. Board of Trustees, 315 F. Supp. 1335, 1344.
46 (W.D. Mich. 1970); November Action Coalition v. Johnson, Civil No. 69-1154-G (D.
Mass. Nov. 4, 1969); Locke v. Vance, 307 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
78. Regents of the Univ. of Colorado v. Fuiks, Civil No. 26035 (Dist. Ct. Boulder
County, Colo. Apr. 20, 1970). Injunctions like this one, regulating protest as to place,
are discussed in detail at pp. 1008-16 infra.
79. Board of Higher Educ. v. Anderson, 162 N.Y.LJ. No. 68 (Oct. 6, 1969) at 17, col,
4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County). The constitutional defect of such injunctions subjecting the
rights of students to assemble to the unrestricted discretion of administrative ofilcials ig
discussed at note 188 infra.
80. The modern prior restraint doctrine has reached its fullest development in the
field of obscene literature. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). There have been
occasions on which the Court has sustained prior restraints on publications, see, e.g.,
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), but in these cases, the expression
already existed on the record, in the form of a book or a film, and could be analyzed on
its face in constitutional terms because the substantive obscenity standards do not relate
to particular reactions or specific audiences.
As regards prospective control of demonstrations, however, the law of prior restraints
is still at a comparatively primitive stage. For example, even the constitutionality of a
requirement that protestors notify officials of an impending demonstration remains
unclear. Compare Lefiore v. Robinson, 434 F.2d 933, 948 (5th Cir. 1970) with Bayless v.
Martine, 430 F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 1970). See generally Note, The Constitutionality of a
Requirement to Give Notice Before Marching, 118 U. PA. L. RrEv. 270 (1969).
81. The prior restraint doctrine also has a procedural aspect which limits the manner
in which the injunctions should be issued. See pp. 1019-27 infra.
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consideration of certain criteria-the most obvious being antipathy
to the protestors' opinions-in the decision to ban a demonstration.s-'
Campus injunctions are seldom overtly content-oriented, however, for
three criteria, ostensibly independent of content, are usually relied
upon to justify suppression of student expression. Sometimes it is
suggested that demonstrators will exceed First Amendment bounds by
partaking in militant forms of protest. At other times, it is feared that
a demonstration will excite or provoke the campus community, lead-
ing ultimately to a disruption of university operations. And, finally,
it is often argued that the campus or parts of it are not suitable forums
for protest activities. Analysis of these standards will reveal that only
a form of the third, namely "traffic control" as to place, is constitu-
tionally tolerable.
The Participants' Future Behavior. Typically, materials introduced
in support of a university's petition for relief from an anticipated
demonstration include a lengthy recitation of the past acts of violence,
intimidation, vandalism, and obstruction which have plagued the cam-
pus.s3 Although administrators have rarely, if ever, tried to enjoin
an outdoor demonstration on the ground that the protestors planned
"action" in addition to "expression,"84 some colleges have sought the
power to ban an indoor demonstration in order to foreclose the pros-
pect of a building occupation. For example, the TRO used at George
Washington last May not only "restrained [defendants] from occupy-
ing and/or possessing in whole or in part the old Student Union
building .... ",s5 but also clothed the university with the authority
to forbid or terminate at will any other indoor demonstration-peace-
ful or obstructive."6
82. Thus, the fundamental principle underlying the sequence of cases on university
speaker bans, see, e.g., Picking v. Bruce, 420 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1969); Brooks v. Auburn
Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969), control of student newspapers, see, e.g., Kor v.
Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 18 (D. Md. 1970); Channing Club v. Board of Regents, 817 F.
Supp. 688 (ND. Tex. 1970), and recognition of student organiza.ions, see A.C.LU of
Virginia v. Radford College, 815 F. Supp. 893 (W.D. Va. 1970), is that e.xpression cannot
be regulated according to its content. But see Kaufman, supra note 49; Blasi, Prior
R~estraints on Demonstrations, 68 Mxcii. L Ray. 1482, 1504-05 (1970).
88. See, e.g., Affidavit of Ralph S. Halford, Vice President for Special Projects of
Columbia University, submitted in Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. December 4 Movement.
No. 440/1970 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, N.Y. Mar. 29, 1970). See also M.I.T. v. Hahnel, No.
0407 (Super. Ct. iddlesex County, Mass. Nov. 8, 1969) (Petition); State of Wisconsin ex
rel. LaFollette v. Cohen, No. 124008 (Cir. Ct Dane County, Wis. Nov. 7, 1967) (Complaint),
reprinted in STUDNT PROTST supra note 12, at 281.
84. They have, in some cases, adopted internal procedures which vould permit
school officials to ban an outdoor demonstration for this reason. See, e.g., Hammond v.
South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (DS.C. 1967) (invalidating regulation as
overbroad prior restraint).
85. George Washington Univ. v. Tizer, Civil No. 1390-70 (D.D.C. May 6, 1970).
86. See note 11 supra.
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Regulating action through curtailing expression cannot constitu-
tionally form the foundation for a prior restraint by injunction. How-
ever convincing the evidence that the demonstrators contemplate
violence or other forms of "action,"87 and however likely it may seem
that their "expression" will be burgeoning with "action," the possi-
bility that protestors will emerge from the umbrella of First Amend-
ment coverage cannot warrant enjoining the demonstration as such.88
As with efforts to regulate membership in organizations, such con-
trol is simply too clumsy.8 9 The Supreme Court, in curtailing the use
of ex parte TROs in First Amendment cases, dispelled any doubts in
this regard that may have been produced by the earlier labor picketing
injunction cases.90 In Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Prin-
cess Anne,91 the Court emphasized:
An order issued in the area of the First Amendment must be
couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-
pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the
essential needs of the public order . . . . [T]he order must be
tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case."
Accordingly, since the injunction is an instrument capable of delicacy
and precision,93 flatly enjoining a demonstration-whether it is to be
held indoors or outdoors-for fear that the proposed expression will
be interlaced with action should be impermissible 4 Instead, the de-
87. Professor Blasi refers to "concrete evidence" of "a specific intent to cause vio.
lence, directed to the specific demonstration and manifested by specific plans," obtained
from the open testimony of informers as well as "documented plans by the demonstrators
to bring equipment such as helmets, baseball bats, and medics." Blasi, supra note 82, at
1509-10. The probative value of some of this evidence-whatever its speciliclty-is highly
questionable.
88. Professor Blasi has reached the opposite conclusion, at least as regards "planned
violence." See Blasi, supra note 82, at 1509-10. Yet, he would not allow a demonstration
to be banned to preclude obscenity, libel, "fighting words," and invasion of privacy. Id.
1503-09. This difference in treatment, under his system of "controlled balancing," results
from the practical impossibility of adequately identifying the latter elements at the per-
mit application stage, id. at 1505-06; consequently, he recommends that the unprotected
speech, rather than the entire demonstration, be enjoined. Id. at 1506.
89. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Comment, Judicial Rewriting
of Overbroad Statutes: Protecting the Freedom of Association from Scales to Robel, 57
CALiF. L. REV. 240 (1969).
90. See 1 T. EMRSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL 9- CIVIL RIGHrTS IN Tni
UNrrE STATES 567-69 (3d ed. 1967).
91. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
92. 393 U.S. at 183-84.
93. See p. 1018 infra.
94. Such a rule is the analogue in the area of prior restraints of the specific intent
requirement, see, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957); United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 176-79 (1st Cir, 1969); Z,
CHAFER, FREE Sp EcH IN ThE UNITED STATES 128-35 (2d ed. 1948), for subsequent punish.
mert. See also note 89 supria.
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cree must prohibit only the threatened unprotected conduct.0 Indi-
viduals who transgressed the bounds of protected speech may then be
punished for contempt without jeopardizing the rights of those who
wished to engage in lawful assembly and expression."
Audience Reaction. Administrators sometimes seek to justify injunc-
tive relief against peaceful protest on the basis of their belief that even
if the demonstrators were themselves well-mannered, conditions would
be too volatile to allow dissidents to voice their discontent. Although
such regulation may be said to be free of content censorship to the
extent it applies to all protest regardless of the issues espoused and
the individuals involved,97 the very consideration of possible audience
reactions in imposing an injunction intended to reach prospective ex-
pression is impermissible.
The case of Lieberman v. Marshall's illustrates what may occur
when the audience reaction factor is introduced into the decision-
making process at the prior restraint stage. In Lieberman the acting
president of Florida State University denied the campus SDS chapter
the use of all school facilities. 90 Upon learning that the group planned
to hold a meeting in the student union, he obtained an ex parte
temporary injunction forbidding the students to use any campus build-
ing for any meetings. 100 The state's highest court affirmed the denial
of a motion to dissolve the injunction. Focusing on the possible cam-
95. E.g., M.I.T. v. Hahnel, No. 30407 (Super. Ct. Middlesex County, Mass. Nov. 3. 1969)
(restraining, inter alia, "employing force or violence, or the threat of force or violence
against persons or property on Massachusetts Institute of Technology premises'). The
federal district court refused to enjoin M.I.T. from enforcing the state court TRO,
emphasizing that the decree "does not enjoin a rally. It does not enjoin the distribution
of handbills .... Rather it enjoins acts [of violence] which plaintiffs say they were not
intending to commit in the first place." November Action Coalition v. Johnson, Civil No.
69-1154-G (D. Mass. Nov. 4, 1969).
96. Cf. Blasi, supra note 82, at 1506. But see note 88 supra.
97. When the protest is aimed at individual administrators or ichool regulations,
content censorship is likely to be involved, at least covertly. See, e.g., Scoville v. Board of
Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Norton %. Discipline Comm.,
419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 906 (1970).
98. 236 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1970).
99. The acting president first denied SDS official recognition as a student organiza-
tion and then invoked a university rule that only officially recognized student organizations
could use university buildings for scheduled meetings, and, that, only with prior per-
mission from the administration. In passing, the Florida court upheld this regulatory
scheme under a clear and present danger test, 236 So. 2d at 124, commenting without
explanation that "denial of recognition of SDS appears to have been valid," id. at 128.
100. The trial judge held that "the restraining order had been necessary because the
confrontation planned and staged by SDS would have created a risk of violence and
would have unduly disrupted the university campus." 236 So. 2d at 124. Since there
was no evidence that the SDS members planned to damage the building or to interfere
with other users, the "risk of violence" the lower court found must have inhered in the
possibility of an uncontrolled audience reaction. Apparently, all that made the meeting
controversial was the fact that the university had proscribed it.
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pus reaction to the proposed SDS meeting,10 1 it declared that an in-
junction would lie against "conduct which without exaggeration could
be termed disruptive, contemptuous, defiant, highly visible and pro-
vocative, intended to bring about a confrontation, and carrying with it
a virus of violence."'10 2
In contrast to the approach taken in Lieberman, no prior restraints
on expression should be imposed on the basis of predictions as to
audience reaction. This conclusion can be derived from two indepen-
dent lines of reasoning.
First, no detailed explication of the clear and present danger test,
the incitement standard, or the ad hoc balancing technique'03 is neces-
sary to see that both the trial and appellate courts must examine the
expression in the context of the surrounding circumstances of each
case before they can decide that the expression is punishable.104 Unlike
the obscenity area where prior restraints have been permitted be-
cause the expression is "fixed" and the constitutional tests "non-situa-
tional,"' 0 5 when demonstrations or public speeches are prohibited in
advance, there is normally no evidence of the contemplated expres-
sion,10 and even if evidence were somehow available, it would be a
rare case in which the context for the proposed expression were so
101. The decision may also have been based on a theory that the university could,
consistent with the First Amendment, limit the use of its facilities to authorized student
groups. This rationale is not, however, made explicit in the opinion, and the principle
outlined at pp. i0o9-10 infra casts doubt on this position as well.
102. 236 So. 2d at 126. To the extent that the entire "confrontation" consists of
violation of an invalid rule, it should not be regulable. See, e.g., Crews v. Clones, 432
F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis.), all'd, 419 F.2d 1034
(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970). But see Schwartz v. Schuker, 289 F. Stipp.
238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
103. These tests are discussed in Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 907-16 (1963). See also Strong, Fifty Years of 'Clear and
Present Danger': From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 Sup. cr. Rmv. 41. It
appears that the clear and present danger test has largely fallen into desuetude, and that
the balancing test is usually applied only in the so-called "indirect cases" where the
impact on speech is caused by a government regulation of "action." See, e.g., Konlgsberg
v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961); Note, Civil Disabilities and the First Ancncnt,
78 YALE L.J. 842, 847 n.16 (1969); Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YAMX
L.J. 1424 (1962).
104. This line of reasoning is equivalent to that introduced in Note, Conspiracy and
The First Amendment, 79 YALE L.J. 872, 879-82 (1970).
105. See Conspiracy, supra note 104, at 881-82.
106. Requiring demonstrators to supply such evidence, even if constitutional, would be
unsatisfactory. See Blasi, supra note 82, at 1505-06. Although past conduct of the
demonstrators might be of some predictive value in limited circumstances, see id. at
1515-20, the Supreme Court has indicated that past conduct would not constitute suf-
ficiently probative evidence of the contemplated expression to warrant a prior restraint.
See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). Lower federal courts, however, have not been
unanimous in excluding consideration of prior expression. See, e.g., Molpus v. Fortune, 432
F.2d 916, 18 (5th Cir. 1970); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 834 (1957).
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dear that the application of one of the three constitutional tests em-
ployed could be anything but "hopelessly speculative."' 07
Second, the necessity for exclusion of all consideration of audience
reaction in imposing prior restraints can be derived from Supreme
Court dispositions of cases involving regulation of street demonstra-
tions or public speakers in order to maintain order. Whether the
threat to the public order came from a sympathetic or an antagonistic
audience, 08 the Court has reversed the convictions of speakers who
were arrested to prevent an outbreak of violence, 00 and has boldly
declared that the exercise of constitutional rights cannot be allowed
to depend on the degree of disorder that is threatened by their asser-
tion.1 0
This general principle is the product of at least three considerations:
(I) a certain amount of unrest and disorder is a price that must be
paid lest there be only noncontroversial or impotent protest;tm (2)
measures less drastic than prior restraints are available to protect the
peace and order of the community should protest result in disorder
or violence;" 2 and, (3) to grant officials the power to curtail assem-
blies before an outbreak of violence would be to give them "complete
discretion to break up othenvise lawful public meetings."' m Because
107. Cf. EAMERSON, supra note 46, at 326.
108. The ideas outlined in the text apply equally when the threat to the public
order comes from an exuberantly friendly audience or when it arises from an implacably
hostile group. In a hostile audience case, however, an additional argument can be ad-
duced-that of the heckler's veto. See, e.g., Note, Regulation of Demonstrations, supra
note 66, at 1775; H. KALvEN, THE NEGoO AND ThE Fmsr Asm.omhra 140-45 (1965).
109. See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); ef. Gregory v. City of
Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Note, Freedom of Speech and Assembly: The Problem of
the Hostile Audience, 49 COLUn. L REv. 1118 (1949). But see Feiner v. New York, 40
U.S. 315 (1951).
110. Statements to this effect have been made not only in regard to street demonstra-
tions and public orators, but also in other First and even Fourteenth Amendment con-
texts. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969), quoted with approval in liachellar
v. Maryland, 397 US. 564, 567 (1970):
It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may
not be prohibited merely because the ideas themselves are offensive to some of the
hearers.
See also Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963); Wright v. Georgia, 373 US.
284, 293 (1963); Cooper v. Aarons, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Incitement, however, is not encompassed by this principle, but its exclusion causes no
inconsistency if incitement is defined as "action," see note 63 supra, and, hence, not a
constitutional right. If it is treated as "expression" that is not protected by the First
Amendment, then the formulation of the audience reaction principle remains intact on
at least a purely verbal level, but, functionally, incitement would then constitute an
exception to the general audience reaction principle.
111. See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
112. Kunz v. New York, 340 US. 290 (1951).
113. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951). See also Hague v. C.T.O.. 307 U.S.
496, 516 (1938). How much discretion should be placed in the hands of police officials is
an issue the Court has not settled. For an enumeration of the salient considerations
pertinent to permitting police to suppress a demonstration when crowd hostility is un-
controllable, see Regulation of Demonstrations, supra note 66, at 1775.
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all these factors are pertinent to prophylactic restraints on campus
demonstrations, exclusion of prognostications about audience reaction
from the injunctive process is warranted.
First, although judicial prose occasionally displays a narrow concep-
tion of the role of the university,114 it seems fair to suggest that since the
campus is in many respects a microcosm of the larger society, and the
college, a community to its students,115 the willingness to embrace
controversial, unsettling, and potentially disruptive protest on the
campus should be at least as great as that which the Constitution de-
mands equally of the tiny hamlet and the sprawling megapolis.110 As in
any municipality, every campus facility may not be appropriate for pro-
test activities,"1 ' but the first ground of the Court's policy remains
fully applicable. The university, like any other community, must en-
dure a certain quantum of disorder lest protest be merely trivial or
ineffectual.
Second, the Court's preference for "appropriate public remedies"118
entails two approaches to coping with unruly public assemblies. One
is subsequent punishment of the speaker 10 or members of the crowd, 120
and the other is contemporaneous crowd control.12' In terms of
campus demonstrations this would mean disciplinary or criminal pro-
ceedings against demonstrators or obstreporous observers, or police
protection for the demonstration.
While the requirement of a posteriori punishment of those who en-
gage in action or expression not protected by the First Amendment
rather than a priori infringement of protected expression is as appli.
cable to the university as it is to the larger society, the position that
an orator may not be silenced if the crowd can be controlled, 12  is a
slightly awkward one to assume in facing campus unrest. Observations
114. See pp. 1012-13 infra.
115. Cf. UNIVERsrrY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, REPORT OF TiE STUDY COr1M'N ON
UNIVERsITY GOVERNANCE, THE CULTURE OF THE UNIVERSITY: GOVERNANCE AND FDUCATION
38 (1968), quoted in Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027,
1043 (1969). See also PPMIDENT'S COMI'N, supra note 2, at 118. But see YALE UNIVERITY
STUDY COAIt'N ON UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE, FINAL REPORT 2-8 (1971).
116. See CoAE~i~ssioN ON M.I.T. EDUCATION, CREATIVE RENEWAL IN A TIME OF CRIS1s
68 (1970). See also note 42 supra.
117. Injunctive regulation of protest according to place is discussed in detail at pp.
1008-16 infra.
118. Kunz v. New York, 340 US. 290, 294 (1951).
119. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951); cf. note 63 supra.
120. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 327 n.9 (1951) (Black, J. dissenting).
121. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 326-27 (1951) (Black, J. dissenting); cf,
Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1938). But see Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 288-89
(Frankfurter, J. concurring).
122. This is the minimum princple which can be culled from Feiner, Terminello, and
Kunz, taken together. See Regulation of Demonstrations, supra note 66, at 1785-87.
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of how police or National Guard have exacerbated tensions and pro-
longed disruptions on campuses are now legion,m and the presence of
police on campus may be a qualitatively different phenomenon that
that of police on a city street.us Nevertheless, the widespread antipathy
of students and political protestors toward the police is a relatively
recent development'2 5 and can be ameliorated by improved police
practices. 126 To the extent that the hostility cannot be eradicated in this
fashion, it is symptomatic of a schism in American society which can
only be widened by repression of expression that is in itself peaceful.' 2-
Finally, the third basis for the Court's declarations-that to allow
officials the power to curtail meetings on the basis of predictions of
violence or disorder would lead to veiled censorship and undue sup-
pression of lawful expression-is pertinent to injunctive regulation on
the campus as well. Although the officials responsible for deciding are
judges rather than police officers and presumably more objective, the
very fact that the demonstration is still in the planning stage means
that their predictions will often approach prophecies and be strongly
influenced by predispositions toward the protestors. The excessive dis-
cretion which resides in anything short of a per se rule excluding
predictions about audience reaction is revealed by the chaos of nu-
merous lower court decisions in which audience reaction is considered
in passing on the validity of subsequent punishments"18 for expression
in the high schools and colleges." 9
123. See, e.g., PPSiDENT'S Comi'N, supra note 2, at 288; W. OiuucK, JL, Snur IT Do%%.,
A COLLEGE IN CRIsIs 154 (Nat'l Comm'n on the Causes and Prevention of Violence Staff
Report No. 6, 1969); Cox CoAM'N, CRISIS AT COLUMBIA (1968).
124. See generally Goodman & Niederhoffer, Universities and The Police: Force and
Freedom on Campus, 1 YALE REv. I.iw & SoCAL ACrION 5 (1970).
125. See SxoLNIcr, supra note 2, at 185-86.
126. The President's Commission on Campus Unrest recommended several departures
from the standard operating procedure of police and National Guard on campuces de-
signed to reduce the inflammatory nature of their presence. For example, massive displays
of force and issuance of lethal weapons can be minimized. See PrRsznY,"rxs Comm's,
.supra note 2, at 165-82. Cf. N.Y. Times Nov. 29, 1970, at 111, col. 1.
127. Cf. PamEENT's COMm'N, supra note 2, at 182-83.
128. Because most of the post-Tinker litigation has involved subsequent punishments,
evidence of disorder in these cases should have been available on the record, tie allegedly
disruptive behavior having already been consummated. Thus, the divergence, conflict, and
confusion apparent in the lower court decisions could only be magnified if the audience
reaction factor were to be used to effect prior restraint of campus protest by injunction.
129. Following Tinker, many cases have purported to require a showing that the for-
bidden expression would interfere with the maintenance of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school. Many have, however, incorrectly construed Tinker to allow punish-
ment of student protestors because of audience reaction, actual or potential. See note 163
infra. These cases are consequently a paradigm of the unacceptable latitude inherent in
regulation as to audience reaction, compare, e.g., Butts v. Dallas Independent School Dist.,
,06 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. Tex. 1969), rev d, 436 F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1971) and Hernandez
v. School Dist., 315 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1970) with Aguirre v. Tahoka Independent
School Dist., 311 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Tex. 1970), and comprise a conflicting if not bizarre
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In short, the policies underlying the Supreme Court's repeated
suggestions that the exercise of constitutional rights cannot be impeded
by the fear that violence and unrest may occasion their assertion are
fully applicable to injunctive regulation of university demonstrations.
As several federal courts have acknowledged, predictions as to audience
reaction should not curtail the right of demonstrators-be they stu-
dents or adults-to travel in First Amendment territory."30
Geographic Restrictions. Since a system of prior restraints on expres.
sion cannot utilize forecasts of what the demonstrators might say, how
they will behave, or how the audience could react, the university, in
utilizing prospective injunctions, can regulate campus protest only by
reference to its time, place and manner.131 Campus injunctions
usually effect this control by outright prohibitions on the use of cer-
tain areas13 2 for First Amendment activities. 3 3 Direct geographic re-
striction of this sort is represented by orders such as the one previously
mentioned in Regents of University of Colorado v. Fulks,184 extending
to "any demonstration, protest or remonstrance [in] any academic or
administrative building."
To evaluate the constitutional validity of such orders necessitates
an examination of those cases which have passed on the acceptability
collection of cases euphemistically described by one Court of Appeals as afloat in "choppy
waters left by Tinker," Eisner v. Stamford Board of Educ., No. 05345 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1971)
130. See, e.g., Crews v. Clones, 432 F.2d 1259, 1265 (7th Cir. 1970) (high school):
We agree with the sentiments voiced by Professor Chafee when he observed that it
is absurd to punish a person 'because his neighbors have no self-control and cannot
refrain from violence . ...'
131. When used in this context, "manner" has a limited meaning:
Manner should be understood to denote only those physical and procedural incidents
of public expression that are neither 'time' nor 'place'-for example, the size and
number of posters that can be displayed in various locations, the volume of sound
amplification, chairmanship of public meetings, identification of persons soliciting
funds, methods of distributing literature, and the myriad of other matters that must
be regulated in order effectively to regulate the speech situation. With this under.
standing, reference to 'manner' should provide no invitation to veiled censorship
O'Neil, Reflections on the Academic Senate Resolution, 54 CAL F. L. REV. 88, 10 1966),
Notice, also, that many of these features of "manner" are intertwined with "place,"
For instance, noise, an attribute of manner, becomes significant only in relation to Its loca.
tion: a boisterous demonstration on an isolated portion of the campus green becomes an
entirely different creature if moved into a classroom during a seminar.
132. The restricted areas are generally academic and administrative buildin~g, though
sometimes all indoor meetings are forbidden. See, e.g., Lieberman v. Marshall, 86 5o. 2d
120 (Fla. 1970).
133. Some orders may constitute indirect place regulations in that the power to declare
portions of the campus loci prohibita is delegated by the injunction to school officials.
These decrees are discussed at p. 1018 infra where it is shown that inasmuch as they
provide no standards to guide the administrator's discretion, they are void for vagueness.
Indeed, by failing to limit the grant of power, these decrees allow recourse to the forbidden
standards of content, participant behavior, and audience reaction; hence, depicting them
as "place regulations" is misleading.
134. Civil No. 26035 (Dist. Ct. Boulder County, Colo. Apr. 20, 1970).
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of particular geographic restrictions on the exercise of First Amend-
ment freedoms. The existence, though not the bounds, of a basic con-
stitutional right to conduct First Amendment activities in most
locations is evident in the flow of cases that has, in recent years, dra-
matically enlarged the domain of demonstrations.'" The courts have
afirmed the rights of protestors to use streets and parks,se state capitol
grounds, 137 a public library,13 a bus terminal, 13 9 and numerous other
facilities. 140
Obversely, they have held or intimated that a jailhouse,141 a prison,' m
a courthouse, 43 a high school classroom, 44 a hospital,1'" a National
Guard armory,146 a military base, 47 and the chambers of a state legis-
lature'48 are not suitable places for noisy, disruptive demonstrations.
At least two major doctrines wind their way through these opinions.
One is that facilities not normally open to the general public may not
be used, even for First Amendment purposes, by members of that
public. 149 This consideration is relevant to situations in which those
who seek to use campus facilities are not members of the college com-
135. Since there can be no discrimination of the right to expression between different
users of the same facilities, protestors may be entitled to access to facilities, even where
this fundamental right is unavailing. Cf. EsansoN et al., supra note 90, at 426.
136. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (plurality opinion); cf. In re Lane, 71 Cal.
2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969) (privately owned street). But see Cox V.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
137. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
138. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
159. Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, $93 U.S.
940 (1968).
140. E.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S.
308 (1968) (privately owned shopping center); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (19-16) (federally
built housing project); M*farsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company owned town);
Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (subw-ay);
Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (Vorld's Fair grounds); In re Hoffman,
67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967) (privately owned railroad terminal).
141. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (5-4 decision). The case did not hold that
no demonstration can ever be held on jailhouse grounds. The Court characterized the
particular demonstration being punished as having obstructed the jail drivermy and having
interfered with the functioning of the jailhouse. Id. at 54 n.5. A demonstration that does
not obstruct the flow of traffic to and from a jail and that does not otherwise disruptjailhouse operations might warrant different treatment. Cf. Note, The Supreme Court,
1966 Term, 81 HAzv. L. REV. 69, 159-41 (1967).
142. Cf. Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971); Berrigan v. Norton, 322 F. Supp.
46, 51 (D. Conn. 1971).
143. Cf. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 US. 611 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US. 559 (1965)(Black, J. dissenting).
144. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (dictum).
145. See 393 U.S. at 512 n.6 (dictum).
146. Jones v. District of Columbia Armory Bd., 438 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
147. See Kilskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1970) (rehearing en banc); United
States v. Bradley, 418 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1969).
148. See United States v. Woodard, 376 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1967); State v. Smith, 46 N.J.
510, 218 A.2d 147 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 838 (1966).
149. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 59, 41 (1966); Jones v. District of Columbia
Armory Bd., 438 F.2d 138 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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munity, and the few cases that have faced this problem have held that
school grounds need not be opened to the general public.150 At the same
time, school grounds are open to the university public. Members of
the college community-at least",'-are normally permitted to walk
freely through campus and to enter academic and administrative build-
ings for various reasons. While there may be a few spots on campus
analogous to the jailhouse in Adderley from which even the university
community is absolutely excluded, the geographic restrictions imposed
by most campus injunctions include areas, like classrooms, which are
very much open to the relevant public for various purposes.162 There-
fore, even if the "open to the public" reading of the cases were with-
out its difficulties,15 3 it could not be used to justify most of the
injunctions that ban campus protest according to its location.
A second doctrine is also implicit in the territorial limitation cases.
In each instance in which First Amendment rights were upheld, the
use of the site as a forum for expression did not conflict with the
facility's usual function. For example, the dissemination of antiwar
literature to servicemen in the public bus terminal in Wolin v. Port
of New York Authority'5 did not interfere with the terminal's opera-
150. Clemson Univ. Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v. Clemson Univ., 306 F. Supp. 129
(D.S.C. 1968); Evers v. Birdsong, 287 F. Supp. 900 (S.D. Miss. 1968); Ellis v. Allen, 4 App.
Div. 2d 343, 165 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1957), appeal dismissed, 4 N.Y.2d 693, 148 N.E2d 302, 171
N.Y.S.2d 86 (1958); cf. Saunders v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 417 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir.
1969). But cf. Jones v. Board of Regents, 436 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1970).
151. Defining the membership of the college community is nontrivial. A definition
must take into account such non-students as alumni, those on leaves of absence, drop-outs
those expelled or suspended for disciplinary or academic reasons, "street people," and the
like. This definitional problem is especially crucial if the geographic restrictions cases are
read as always allowing exclusion of persons from areas not normally open to the public.
152. The fact that students may never have been permitted to use these areas for
First Amendment purposes in the past does not satisfy the "not normally open to public"
principle. Cf. note 153 infra. For example, the public that frequented the Logan Valley
Plaza, see 891 U.S. 808 (1968), had never been allowed to use the property for First
Amendment objectives, but the area was undeniably "open to the public." The issue Is
only whether a property owner-public or private-having opened his property to one
use by the public can then deny them the right to use it as a forum for expression.
153. Primarily, there is the difficulty of defining what is meant by "open to the
public" in a logically consistent manner. Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 US. 308 (1968) and its progeny make it clear that characterizing a
facility as open to a subset of the general public, in those cases, patrons, will not by It-
self suffice to exclude other members of the public, in those cases, non-patrons, from access
to the facilities for First Amendment purposes. Perhaps what is determinative is not so
much "the population who take advantage of the general invitation extended," Wolin v.
Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968),
as it is the population to whom the general invitation is extended. For example, whereas
the shopping center invites any member of the general public on its grounds, tie army
base allows only soldiers and civilian employees. Thus, if a proprietor grants only a subset
of the general population access to his property, and if that subset is defined by some
other characteristic than nonexerdse of First Amendment rights, then members of the
general public who are not members of the allowed subset might be denied access to tile
property.
154. 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
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tion as a transportation service. Since, in these cases, mutual coexistence
was possible, deciding between the two uses was unnecessary, and it
sufficed to say, as the Court did in the Logan Valley case,"s that "the
State may not delegate the power . . . to exclude members of the
public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the
premises" when the protest is "generally consonant with the use to
which the property is put."'";
On the other hand, in the situations where the expression and usual
function were mutually incompatible, that is, where the proposed
First Amendment activity would necessarily constitute intolerable
interference with the usual operation of the property, the courts have
favored the property's normal use over its potential as a forum for such
expression. Viewed in this manner, the territorial limitation cases can
be said to stand for the proposition that while demonstrators have no
First Amendment right to use private or public property for such man-
ner of expression as would substantially interfere with the normal use
to which the property is dedicated, they are protected in conducting
protests that are not incompatible with the property's usual function.2'57
This mutual incompatibility standard underlying the geographic
restriction cases has an immediate impact on the territorial limitations
in campus injunctions. At the most elementary level, it means that dem-
onstrations cannot be extirpated from the college campus.15 s In this
regard, the Supreme Court's use of the mutual incompatibility stan.
dard in its most recent opinion on the suitability of a particular lo-
cation for protest activities, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District,59 is instructive. In Tinker the Court invalidated the suspen-
sions of high and junior high school students for wearing black arm-
bands to class to dramatize their opposition to the Vietnam War.
The holding of the Court was quite narrow, being only that
"where there is no finding and no showing that the forbidden conduct
would 'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,' the pro-
155. 391 US. 508 (1968).
156. 391 U.S. at 319.
157. It is possible, to read Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), as holding that "the
state may designate certain sensitive government facilities as totally off limits to public de-
bate .... " The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, supra note 141, at 139, but the interpretation
of note 141 supra is preferable.
158. Of course, this fairly simple result can be reached without the aid of the intel-
Iectual apparatus that has been constructed. One need merely note that "the college campus
is a type of community analogous to a town or city," Ha-Lkell, Student Expression in the
Public Schools: Tinker Distinguished, 59 GEo. I.J. 37, 43 (1970), and invoke Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 US. 501, 508 (1945).
159. 393 US. 503 (1969).
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hibition cannot be sustained."' 60 The Court proceeded, however, to
introduce the influential dictum1 6' that protest is permissible in the
high school only to the extent it does not disrupt classwork or inter-
fere with the rights of others.162 This proscription of "disruption 03
is, in short, a simple variation on the mutual incompatibility theme of
the geographic restriction cases, allowing some protest in the classroom
but excluding noisy or obstreperous ones.
Since protest acceptable in the high school is a fortiori suitable for
the university,' Tinker, as a specific application of the more general
incompatibility standard, disposes of the argument that "the facilities
160. 393 U.S. at 508. The Tinker Court was not confronted with the material and
substantial disruption it eschewed. Id. at 508. Nor did it say what would constitute an
adequate showing of the forbidden conduct. At most, it pointed out that "undifferentiated
fear" would not suffice. Id. In addition, the opinion was not directed to the prior re-
straint issue. But cf. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., No. 35345 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1971).
161. For a survey of post-Tinker litigation applying (or, if the analysis of note 163
infra is accurate, misapplying) the disruption dicta in the high schools, see Haskell, supra
note 158, at 40-50; cf. note 129 supra.
162. The Court admonished, 593 U.S. at 513:
But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason-whether or
not it stems from the time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, notimmunized by the guarantee of freedom of speech.
163. The opinion seems to proceed on a rhetorical theory that clarity is to be
achieved through prolixity. What is meant by the numerous references to "disrup'
tion" is obscure. Ab initio, two overlapping interpretations are plausible. One is that
"disruption" means conduct which, by virtue of being noisy, obstructive, or violent,
interferes with the operation of the high school. Hence, when the Court condemns dig.
ruption which "stems from time, place, or type of behavior," see note 162 supra, It Is
saying that if a demonstration is held at a time and place and in a manner so as to
directly interfere with a class, obstruct corridors, etc., the participants can be punished,
but the fact that it creates a risk of stimulating other students to the condemned activities
is not germane.
The other interpretation of "disruption" would include conduct which is itself peaceful
but distracts students from their school work or provokes a hostile reaction. Proponents
of this exigesis might rely on the fact that the Court cites approvingly Blackwell v,
Issaquena Cty. Board of Ed., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966), the case which allowed hostility
to the wearing of freedom buttons to curtail that form of peaceful expression,
I This latter bit of hermeneutics must, however, be rejected. The majorty dearly main.
tains that "there is no indication that the work of the schools or any class was disrupted."
393 U.S. at 508. Yet, Justice Black finds "detailed testimony" to supply ample evidence
of interference with particular classes. Id. at 517-18. This discrepancy can best be recon-
ciled if the disruption of which the majority speaks relates exclusively to the conduct
of the demonstrators and not all to the reactions of the audience. Cf. id. at 517. Further-
more, only this interpretation is possible if Tinker is to be compatible with the hostile
audience cases, see notes 108-10 supra; cf. Berkman, Students in Court: Free Speech and
the Functions of Schooling in America, 40 HARv. ED. Rv. 567, 591-95 (1970). But see
Eisner v. Stamford Board of Educ., No. 35345 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1971); Butts v. Dallas inde.
pendent School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971).
164. Not only are different levels of maturity involved, see 393 U.S. at 515 (Stewart,
J. concurring); Haskell, supra note 158, at 48-44; Wright, supra note 115, at 1052-58, but
the physical environment and social structure make it, if anything, a more appropriate
site for demonstrations. See note 115 supra.
Although it is clear that the rights of college students cannot be less than those of
their high school colleagues, some courts have been unwilling to equate the two. See, e.g.,
Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 288, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). Contra Scoville v. Board of
Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 13 n,5 (7th Cir.) (rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
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of state colleges and universities, dedicated as they are to the specialized
function of education, may be utilized solely for that purpose."'01 5 If
nondisruptive protest in even a high school classroom cannot be pun-
ished, a court commits flagrant constitutional error when it enjoins
members of the college community from holding equally nondisruptive
demonstrations in university buildings, as state courts in Colorado and
Florida have done. 66
Of course, the mutual incompatibility standard has two components.
The first-that if protest is nondisruptive, it cannot be prohibited-
is affirmative in its protection of First Amendment rights. In its inverse
form, however, the rule can be used to curtail expression as the Tinker
dictum expressly contemplates. If the restrictive aspect of the standard
is applicable to all parts of the university, nonviolent and nonobstruc-
tive protest could be excluded from a specified area where the expres-
sion would take place in such a manner as to cause substantial
interference with the normal activities that are conducted therein.
Examples of such innately disruptive and, hence, enjoinable First
Amendment activities would include marching down the aisles of an
ongoing class, chanting slogans in the school library and shouting
down campus speakers. 167 In these situations the enjoinable conduct is
165. Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 969 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Snyder v. Board of
Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927, 933 (almost identical dictum). The Supreme Court specifically
rejected this limited conception of education in Tinker, writing:
The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students
during prescribed hours for certain types of activities. Among these activities is per-
sonal intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of
the process of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational process.
593 U.S. at 512.
166. See p. 1008 & note 132 supra. Thus, one federal district court recently struck down
a university rule against indoor demonstrations by observing "[n]o showing has been made
that every building on campus houses such facilities that the presence of even a limited
number of persons would be disruptive of those facilities." Sword v. Fox, 317 F. Supp.
1055 (W.D. Va. 1970).
167. Examples of such conduct are, unfortunately, not hard to find. See, e.g., Donald
v. University of Mississippi, Civil No. WC-70-13-5 (N.D. Miss. June 29, 1970) (eight students
suspended for disrupting performance of singing group "Up with People'), 3 CoL.. L.
Bu.L. 4-5 (1970); State of Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette v. Cohen, No. 124008 (Cir. Ct. Dane
County, Wis. Nov. 7, 1967) (complaint for TRO alleging "organized heckling" against Sen-
ator Edward Kennedy); State v. Davis, 21 Ohio App. 2d 261, 257 N.E.2d 79 (1969) (heckling
Vice President Agnew at Ohio State Commencement exercises). Of course, in all these
situations the disruption must be substantial. For example, the volume of noise per-
missible for an outdoor demonstration near an office normally filled with the clatrer of
typewriters is surely larger than that tolerable for a protest in the school library. A case
that "comes dose to the borderline, and that emphasizes how permissive the courts have
been to the universities," Wright, supra note 115, at 1048-49, is Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d
73 (2d Cir. 1968). Demonstrators at Alfred University disrupted a scheduled ROTC re-
view by forming a line between the reviewing stand and the field, willfully obstructing
the view. The Second Circuit held that the dozen or so students who, although peaceful
and orderly, refused to honor a Dean's request to leave the field were properly punished,
and Judge Friendly, writing for the Court, remarked somewhat simplistically that "(t]he
fact that the demonstration was much less violent than other unhappy incidents of the
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neither violent nor physically obstructive, but when held in certain
places at certain times, it inevitably becomes substantially disruptive.
This judgment may be made under the restrictive part of the mutual
incompatibility standard to impose a prior restraint because it entails
no consideration of content or audience reaction. The disfavored con-
duct is disruptive no matter what its message and no matter how
calmly or vehemently the audience behaves.1 8
A few injunctions have apparently attempted to operate along the
lines of the mutual incompatibility standard. For example, at Colum-
bia University the conduct enjoined in 1970 included "disturbing or
interfering with any lawful assemblage or meeting of persons . . . on
campus" as well as "creating or broadcasting ... loud or excessive
noise that ... interferes with the conduct of normal activities by mem-
bers of the University community." ' Although overly vague in the
specification of "disturbing or interfering," 1 0 such orders at least reflect
a rudimentary awareness that in dealing with nonviolent and nonob-
structive demonstrations, a court cannot give the university the power to
exclude protest that is not intrinsically incompatible with the activi-
ties usually conducted in the location to which the demonstrators lay
claim.
In short, strict application of the mutual incompatibility standard
to all campus facilities would afford complete protection for all non-
disruptive protests. Orders like the one restraining "entering any
academic or administrative building of the University of Colorado
for the purpose of conducting any demonstration, protest, or remon-
strance"' 71 would be voided not because dissident students would be
given the right to interrupt classes or occupy offices, but because, as with
the armbands in Tinker, their demonstration might not substantially
interfere with university operations in classrooms and offices. Inversely,
the restrictive side of the mutual incompatibility standard would enable
the university to protect itself from all conduct which would preclude
its facilities from being put to their normal use. Students wishing to
recent past does not mean that it had not passed the limits Alfred was permitted to
tolerate; the R.O.T.C. cadets and parents had rights too." 407 F.2d at 85,
168. Prohibition of such conduct would be, in the terminology introduced by Professor
Emerson, traffic control regulation, allocating facilities among activities which are In.
trinsically incompatible if held simultaneously. The "traffic control" metaphor is most
valuable in analyzing administrative control of facilities which may be used for First
Amendment purposes. See EMERsON supra note 58, at 102.
169. Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. December 4 Movement, No. 4340/1970 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County Mar. 19, 1970).
170. See note 177 infra.
171. Regents of Univ. of Colo. v. Fulks, Civil No. 26035 (Dist. Ct. Boulder County,
Colo. Apr. 20, 1970).
1014
Vol. 80: 987, 1971
Equity on the Campus
stage guerilla theatre would be able to use such areas as the campus
green, the school auditorium, even unoccupied classrooms, but their
performance would be excluded from taking place in the midst of,
say, a physics lecture.
The most serious objection to a literal adherence to the mutual
incompatibility standard as just stated is that the protective side to the
standard might encroach on the university's power to fashion reason-
able place regulations. -72 For example, since even the noisiest protest
cannot be said to interfere with the use of a classroom building at a
time when no classes are using the building, it might seem that the
university could never enforce a reasonable dosing hour. Similarly,
if the university administration or the student government has adopted
a regulatory system for the auditorium in which student groups must
register in advance to reserve the room, letting First Amendment
users who have not complied with this requirement into the facility
merely because no one else happens to be in the room at the time
might interfere with the operation of what may be an acceptable
administrative scheme for the allocation of university facilities' 73
The simplest solution to this dilemma is to allow the injunction to
incorporate previously existing administrative regulations if the uni-
versity desires. One important qualification must be attached to this
option. The previously existing regulations must themselves be reason-
172. It might also be suggested that where the protective aspect of the standard does
not allow the university adequate regulatory power, the restrictive half grants it an ex-
cessive amount. Specifically, using the negative half of the standard to deny demon-
strators access to parts of the campus when and where the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms would necessarily constitute intolerable interference with normal university
operations is tantamount to deciding that the usual uses to which any and all campus
facilities are put inevitably outweigh the potential of the property as a forum for -x-
pression. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, supra note 141, at 140. However, in view
of the Supreme Court's unwillingness to countenance any disruptive demonstrations in
sucli facilities as jails, courthouses, high schools, and hospitals, see cases cited, notes 141-45
supra, such an argument could only apply to areas within the campus that are neither
academic nor administrative buildings, and even in these areas, the problem is usually
one of sharing resources rather than exclusive use. Cf. note 168 supra.
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that even under the mutual incompatibility
standard, the university would be unable to exorcise all First Amendment activities from
any location by defining "normal use" so as not to include expression. Cf. note 152 supra.
For example, a university could not successfully argue that the "normal use" of its audi-
torium is to house concerts, plays, and non-political speakers so that an SDS.spon-ored
appearance of Abbie Hoffman would necessarily interfere with "normal use." This argu-
ment is equivalent to that rejected by the Second Circuit in Wolin v. Neiv York Port
Authority, 892 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968), where it was contended
that a bus terminal exists to accommodate travellers and not to serve as a platform for
anti-war protestors. Once the university public is allowed to use the auditorium for the
first set of reasons, they cannot be denied access to it as a forum for expression except in
a situation where the latter use would actually interfere with a concert, play or nonpolitical
speaker.
173. The validity of a registration requirement should not be accepted without
question. See note 80 supra.
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able rules as to time, place and manner, not involving any of the
forbidden standards of content or audience reaction. A general defi-
nition of "reasonableness" in this context is virtually impossible,"1 4 but
courts have struck down particular per se rules as unreasonable re-
straints on expression.175
In summary, then, the mutual incompatibility standard, as derived
from the direct geographic restriction cases, should mean that campus
injunctions which impose prospective territorial restraints on peaceful
protest are valid if and only if: (1) they are limited to expression which
would inescapably produce substantial interference with the usual
activities conducted in those locations; or (2) they incorporate estab-
lished, valid per se rules or permit systems for sharing the facility in
question.
b. Vagueness and Overbreadth. Drafting campus injunctions which
can serve as acceptable prior restraints is no simple task. The orders
must be written with sufficient generality to protect the campus from
all forms of "action" which would render unrealizable the educational
mission of the university, but at the same time, it is essential that such
generality be achieved without encroaching on protected forms of
"expression."176
In an overzealous pursuit of the requisite generality, prospective
injunctions are frequently replete with ambiguous phraseology and
174. Professor Blasi has attempted to place the problem in a manageable context. See
Blasi, supra note 82, at 1501-03.
175. See, e.g., LeFlore v. Robinson, 434 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1970); Mosley v. Police
Dep't, 432 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1970); Davis v. Francois, 393 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1969); Rowe
v. Campbell Union High School Dist., Civil No. 51060 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1970), 3 Couarot
L. BULL. 34 (1971).
Usually, injunctions which enforce pre-existing university closing times for buildings
are acceptable. Cf. Cholmakjian v. Board of Trustees, 315 F. Supp. 1335 (W.D. MIch,
1970); In re Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966). Because most of the
time, the university would be justified in desiring a firm dosing hour for indoor fadil-
ties, a per se rule is tolerable. On the other hand, when departure from rigid closing
times would not impose any burden on the university, the validity of this type of per se
restriction may be seriously challenged. For example, to the extent that an Injunction
against "[u]nauthorized occupation after the customary closing time . of areas normally
open to public traffic or gathering," Trustees of Dartmouth College v, John Doe, No.
10795 (Super. Ct. Grafton County, N.H. May 6, 1969), prevented a peaceful assembly In,
say, a parking lot or dormitory, it would be improper as enforcing overly restrictive per se
rules. Unlike the student center situation, where a departure from the normal closing
time requires the university to provide the demonstrators with light and heat, and might
necessitate keeping a security guard on duty throughout the night, allowing students to
assemble in these facilities need not entail any added expenditures on the part of uni-
versity. Therefore, on most occasions it would be unreasonable for the university to bal
meetings in these areas after officially designated closing times, and such per se restraints
should fail.
176. For a general discussion of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, see, e.g.,
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844 (1970); Note,
The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 CoLurm. L. REV. 808 (1969).
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consequently may fail to afford the defendants fair notice of what is
proscribed.177 It is not uncommon, for instance, to be enjoined from
"impairing lawful activities on university premises,' 178 from "congre-
gating or assembling . . . in such manner as to disturb or interfere
with normal functions and activities," 179 or from "committing any act
which will obstruct the orderly processes of [the] college."' 80
Even when injunctions specify in crystal-clear terms the behavior
enjoined, all too frequently they are overbroad in that they inad-
vertently outlaw protected expression in their sweeping prohibitions.
Campus injunctions have suffered from overbreadti as to the people,
places, and conduct they have governed. Whether under any circum-
stances equity has the power to issue an order binding all who receive
notice is doubtful,' 8 ' but when the decree may impair the First Amend-
ment rights of those unrelated to the civil controversy giving rise to
the injunction, there can be no question but that an order running to
"all other persons receiving notice of the order"as- is improper. Some
injunctions, like the one in Lieberman v. Marshall,1s3 denying a stu-
dent group the use of all campus buildings at all times for all meet-
177. The resemblance between the language of campus injunctions and that utilized
in early labor injunctions is striking. Compare the excerpts quoted in the text with, for
instance, the portion of the order in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,
422 (1911), forbidding "in any manner whatsoever impeding, obstructing. interfering with,
or restraining complainant's business," and long criticized as "terminology of vague and
profoundly controversial significance," FRaNr uRTER & GmENr., supra note 1, at 97. CI.
Severson v. Duff, 322 F. Supp. 4 (M.D. Fla. 1970); Neal v. Still, 455 S.V.2d 921, 922 (Ark.
1970). But cf. Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 318 F. Supp. 608 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
178. George Washington Univ. v. Tizer, Civil No. 1390-70 (D.D.C. May 6, 1970).
179. Board of Higher Educ. v. Marcus, 63 Misc. 2d 268, 311 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1970).
180. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. John Doe, No. 10795 (Super. CL Grafton County,
N.H. May 6, 1969).
181. 18th and 19th century courts repeatedly declared that an injunction bound only
parties to the suit. See, e.g., Iveson v. Harris, 32 Eng. Rep. 102 (Ch. 1802). Although the
modem view is more expansive, see generally Note, Binding Nonparties to Injunction
Decrees, 49 MINN. L. REV. 719 (1965), it is generally agreed that attempts to bind all
persons cognizant of an injunction are void. See Developments, supra note 27, at 1030;
Binding Nonparties, supra, at 736-737.
At the same time, injunctive orders need not be limited to named individuals. Ti .e
like the one issued for George Washington University in a 1970 building occupation case,
George Washington Univ. v. Tizer, Civil No. 1390-70 (D.D.C. May 6, 1970), phrased so as
to bind "said defendants and all persons acting in active concert and participation with
them," are not objectionable. See cases cited, Binding Nonparties, supra, at 723 n.28. Simi-
larly, the class action concept, as codified, for example, in FED. R. Ctv. P. 23, can be
used to extend the binding force of an injunction beyond the individuals named. How-
ever, even under this approach, it is doubtful that an effort to enjoin "all persons on
the premises of [the] College," Trustees of Dartmouth College v. John Doe, No. 10795
(Super. Ct. Grafton County, N.H. May 6, 1969), can be redeemed. Cf. Binding Non-
parties, supra, at 732-33.
182. Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. December 4th Movement No. 4340/1970 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County Mar. 19, 1970).
183. 236 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1970).
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ings, 84 prevent access to facilities, such as the student center, that are
completely acceptable forums for protest. 8 5 Even the University of
Colorado order covering only academic and administrative buildings
is overbroad for, although the places it lists are unsuitable for noisy,
mass demonstrations, that TRO extends to "any demonstration, pro-
test, or remonstrance,"18 6 including, presumably, a single picketer
carrying his sign up and down the corridor of an almost empty class-
room building.18 7 Similarly, the decrees which vest in school officials
unlimited power to terminate or prohibit any protest in any campus
building 88 or simply forbid student leaders from returning to cam-
pus 89 go far beyond the objective of preventing disruptive conduct but
potentially preclude participation in perfectly permissible protest.
Because one of the great benefits of the injunctive remedy in handling
campus disputes is that the orders can be patterned to the specific dis-
ruption without jeopardizing First Amendment rights,10 the large
184. See pp. 1003-04 supra. The Florida Supreme Court found the order sufficlently
narrow because it "did not ban S.D.S. from the Florida State University campus . . . ,Y
Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120, 128 (Fla. 1970), but "merely restrained unlawfully
occupying and unauthorizedly using any building ... " 286 So. 2d at 126-27 (emphasis
in original).
185. See pp. 1008-16 supra.
186. Trustees of Univ. of Colorado v. Fulk, Civil No. 26035 (Dist. Ct. Boulder County,
Colo. Apr. 20, 1970).
187. Cf. cases cited, note 175 supra.
188. Examples of this species of overbreadth are plentiful. The TRO found defective
in Board of Higher Educ. v. Anderson, 162 N.Y.L.J. No. 68 (Oct. 6, 1969) at 17, col. 4
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), criminalized "[c]ongregating or assembling within or adjacent to
any . . . academic buildings, recreational rooms or athletic facilities or in any corridors,
stairways, doorways, . . except as may be expressly permitted ... " and the same provi-
sion was employed in the order at issue in Board of Higher Educ. v. Marcus, 63 Misc. 2d
268, 311 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1970). Even when students are not forced
to obtain authorization from college officials to assemble in or around school buildings,
much the same result is achieved by delegating to the officials unlimited power to dis-
band demonstrations in specified facilities. See George Washington Univ. v. Tizer, Civil
No. 1390-70 (D.D.C. May 6, 1970); Scott v. Alabama Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 2865-N (M.D.
Ala. May 14, 1969), reported in STUDENT PROTEST, supra note 12, at 315; Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. John Doe, No. 10795 (Super. Ct. Grafton County, N.H. May 6,
1969).
Orders such as these should not survive even the most superficial analysis. As.
suming that enough state involvement to trigger the First Amendment can be found, see
note 43 supra, it is firmly established that the vesting of such unfettered authority is
constitutionally unpalatable. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 891 U.S. 147
(1969); LeFlore v. Robinson, 434 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1970); Wisconsin Student Ass'n v.
Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin, 318 F. Supp. 591 (W.D. Wis. 1970) (3 judge court). But cf.
O'Leary v. State, 441 S.W.2d 150 (Ky.), appeal dismissed, 596 U.S. 40 (1969).
189. See Hearings on SDS Before House Comm. on Internal Security, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 479 (1969) (reporting SDS leaders enjoined from returning to Kent State
University after being criminally charged); cf. Board of Higher Edue. v. Anderson, 162
N.Y.L.J. No. 68 (Oct. 6, 1969) at 17, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1969) (striking down
portion of order enjoining faculty member from entering Queens College campus without
permission of administration); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 36.47 (1970 Supp.); N.Y. Times, Mar. 14,
1971, at 46, col. 1 (tenured professor at Stanford enjoined from entering central portion
of campus).
190. ABA Report, supra note 24, at 28.
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number of vague and overbroad injunctions that have issued is es-
pecially unjustifiable.
If injunctions are to realize their potential as a device for encourag-
ing free exercise of First Amendment rights while maintaining cam-
pus order, several simple principles should guide their deployment.
Only named parties, members of the same class,'"' and individuals
personally served should be bound. The vague language of eschewing
"disrupting" or "interfering" with "lawful missions" or "normal oper-
ations" must be abandoned in favor of terminology which leaves no
doubt that it is only intolerable interference with university opera-
tions that is proscribed, and this, only when the interference is caused
by the protestors rather than the audience.102 Likewise, to cure the de-
fect of overbreadth, it is not "any demonstration" that should be for-
bidden, but only those that do not satisfy the modified mutual incom-
patibility standard. Implementing these principles might make for
more wordy injunctions, but it would also eliminate the possibility-
and all too frequently, the actuality-of decrees which are so vague
that it is impossible to say whether they engulf protected expression or
else are so broad that it is obvious that they do abridge First Amend-
ment freedoms on the campus.0 3
c. Procedural Safeguards. In addition to the constraint that campus
injunctions against expression must be narrowly and precisely drafted
to function as a system of traffic controls based on a standard of mutual
incompatibility allocating campus facilities between their ordinary
uses and their role as forums for expression, the demands of what has
been called "First Amendment due process" should also condition the
granting of campus injunctions. In recent years the Supreme Court has
displayed increasing sensitivity to the procedural problems raised by
prior restraints on demonstrations,19 and lower courts have begun to
191. L.e., members of an association with an established structure formed prior to the
commencement of the suit. See Binding Nonparties, supra note 182, at 732.
192. If the injunction contains provisions against violence and physical obstruction,
see note 95 supra, then the problem of a hostile audience is solved quite as effectively
as can be accomplished with the picturesque restraint of "vigilante action" found in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. John Doe, No. 10975 (Super. Ct. Grafton County, N.H.
May 6, 1969).
193. An injunction which is almost free of vagueness and overbreadth was requested
by the University of Wisconsin. See note 3 supra. Although that order contained ter-
minology as to counseling and inciting that is troublesome, see note 63 supra, it success-
fully spelled out the meaning of "disruption" in terms of the demonstrators behavior.
See State of Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette v. Cohen, No. 124008 (Cir. CL Dane County. Wis.
Nov. 7, 1967), reprinted in STuDETr PRor.Sr, supra note 12, at 295-96.
194. The majority in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (196,. ob-
served that the constitutionality of a permit scheme depends in part on "the availabiity
of expeditious judicial review of the Commission's refusal of a permit," id. at 155 n.A,
and stressed the relevance of Freedman, and Mr. Justice Harlans concurring opinion
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apply the principles of Freedman v. Maryland,0 8 the case that imposed
constitutional requirements on the procedures chosen for film censor-
ship, 96 to schools, 197 and to demonstrations as well.108
In Freedman a Baltimore theater owner exhibited a film without
first submitting it to the State Board of Censors as statutorily mandated.
Acknowledging that the requirement of prior submission was not in
itself invalid, 99 the Court proceeded to enumerate a series of proce-
dural strictures, providing, in essence,200 that an administrative agency
cannot restrain exhibition unless the following conditions are met:
(1) the exhibitor is assured that the agency will take prompt action;201
(2) the burden of proving the film should be banned lies with the
agency; (3) an agency decision adverse to the exhibitor is affirmed and
enforced by judicial decree; 20 2 (4) a restraint imposed in the interim
only preserves the status quo; and (5) the final judicial decision is ob-
tained promptly.2 3
Although the Freedman standards were formulated with the idea
of an administrative regulatory system in mind,2 4 the fact that the
argued that the Freedman principles should apply a fortiori to regulatory schemes for
political demonstrations. See id. at 162-63.
In that same year the Court imported Freedman's demand for an adversary proceeding
into the context of injunctive regulation of demonstrations. See Carroll v. President and
Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (discussed at pp. 1022-25 infra).
195. 380 U.S. 51 (1968).
196. Freedman was by no means the first case to impose procedural limitations on
obscenity regulation; it is, in fact, the synthesis of a line of cases establishing the necessity
for prior adversary hearings in state obscenity determinations. See generally Note, Prior
Adversary Hearings on the Question of Obscenity, 70 CoLuMr. L. REv. 1403, 1403.07
(1970).
197. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., No. 35345 (2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1971) Scoville v.
Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.) (rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826
(1970); Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 973 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
198. See, e.g., LeFlore v. Robinson, 434 F.2d 933, 946-48 (5th Cir. 1970); Hurwitt v, City
of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995 (NJ). Cal. 1965).
199. 380 U.S. at 53-57.
200. The Court's enumeration of the rules is at 390 U.S. at 58-59.
201. Subsequent cases provide quantitative upper bounds on the period allowed for
administrative action. Fifty-seven days is too long, Teitel Film Corp. v. Cussack, 390 U.S.
139 (1968), and the least upper bound, though still undefined, exceeds 12 days plus at.the.
earliest-practical time, Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968).
Other than the allocation of burden of proof, what procedural safeguards may be re-
quired at the hearing stage has not yet been revealed.
202. This refers only to the trial court, Interstate Circuit Inc. v. City of Dallas, 590
U.S. 676 (1968), but means that a decision and not merely a hearing by the court must
be made promptly, Teitel Film Corp. v. Cussack, 390 U.S. 139 (1968).
203. The interim period during which the administrative board may impose a tempo.
rary restraint is at least as long as 19 days. See Interstate Circuit Inc. v. City of Dallas,
390 U.S. 676 (1968); Universal Film Exchanges, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 288 F. Supp. 286
(N.D. Ill. 1968).
204. Although commentators have made substantial efforts to apply the Freedman
principles to the administrative regulation of demonstrations, their application to the
injunctive process has not been fully discussed. See Blasi, note 82 supra; Monaghan,
First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1970); Note, Parade Ordinances
and Prior Restraints, 30 Oiuo STATE L.J. 856 (1969); Note, Parades and Protest Damon.
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university dispenses with the administrative hearing stage and proceeds
directly to court makes them no less meaningful. Indeed, the very
omission of even a minimal hearing intensifies the need for later safe-
guards.
Burden of Proof. By moving into court immediately to obtain a TRO
or preliminary injunction, the university substitutes a limited judicial
hearing for the initial administrative determination in Freedman. In
so doing the university circumvents the fundamental demand woven
throughout the Freedman decision-that "the burden of proving that
the [expression] is unprotected must rest on the censor."20-8 A TRO
may be obtained without fulfilling this burden because the relief is
only intended "to preserve an existing situation in statu quo until the
court has an opportunity to pass on the merits of a demand for a pre-
liminary injunction";200 likewise, the application for the preliminary
injunction does not involve a hearing on the merits207 for its function
is to preserve the same status quo pending a final adjudication on a
motion for a permanent injunction.208 Thus, the plaintiff need make
no showing on the First Amendment issues. Once he establishes his
need for temporary relief, usually by demonstrating the probability of
irreparable injury, it is the defendant who must prove that his conduct
is protected by the First Amendment if the question is to be raised at
all. Thus, although a TRO or preliminary injunction constitutes the
sort of interim relief the Freedman Court exonerated, the injunctive
procedure allows it to be obtained without the censor (here, the uni-
versity) meeting the burden of proof the Court held constitutionally
indispensable.
A university administration could fulfill this burden in two ways.
strations: Punctual Judicial Review of Prior Restraints on First Amendment Liberties,
45 Ia. L.J. 114 (1969); Note, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 MARv. L. REv. 69, 145-
46 (1967); cf. Note, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 512 (1971).
205. 308 US. at 58. The allocation of the burden of proof on one whose actions
might adversely affect free expression is supported also by such cases as Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Speiser
v. Randall, 357 US. 513 (1958).
206. Pan American World Airways v. Flight Eng'rs Int'l Assn, 306 F.2d 8410, 842-43
(2d Cir. 1962).
207. United States v. First Natl Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 385 (1965); Rogers v. Hill, 289
U.S. 582 (1933). At most, some jurisdictions require a showing of the likelihood of success
on the later hearing for a permanent injunction. See, e.g., Exhibitors Poster Exchange,
Inc. v. Nat'l Screen Service Corp., No. 30886 (5th Cir. April 30, 1971); Anderon v. Laird,
437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1971). In addition, the showings by the pleadings as well as the
evidentiary requirements for a temporary injunction are less than those for a permanent
injunction. See, eg., O'Brien v. Matual, 14 Ill. App. 2d 173, 144 N.E.2d 446 (197).
208. Exhibitors Poster Exchange, Inc. v. Natl Screen Service Corp., No. 30886 (5th
Cir. April 30, 1971).
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As with obscenity, the conduct against which the injunction is desired
might be shown to lie entirely outside the First Amendment; 2°0 that is,
the decree requested might be aimed exclusively at unprotected "ac-
tion"-violence and physical obstruction.210 Alternately, the university
might concede that the conduct it opposes is "expression," but estab-
lish that it is nevertheless "unprotected" from the order being re-
quested. This second course would normally consist of proving that
the decree is simply a narrowly drafted traffic control regulation pur-
suant to the mutual incompatibility standard.211 Whichever strategy
might be chosen, though, Freedman should mean that, just as equity
now demands proof of irreparable harm, a university administration
which desires injunctive relief from student protest should also bear
both the burden of coming forth with the evidence and the risk of
non-persuasion on the question of whether the protest is "unprotected."
Notice and Adversary Proceedings. To impose the burden of proof
on a party that is unopposed would implement little more than a re-
vised rule of pleading.21 2 Thus, the Supreme Court in Freedman em-
phasized the necessity of an adversary proceeding and in Carroll v.
President and Commissioners of Princess Anne213 it imposed the same
requirement on state injunctive regulation of demonstrations. Rather
than invalidate a TRO restraining a white supremacist organization
from holding any rallies "which will tend to disturb or endanger ...
citizens" 214 on substantive grounds, the Court directed its opprobrium
at a "basic infirmity" in procedure, namely, that it "was issued ex
parte, without notice to petitioners and without any effort, however
informal, to invite or permit their participation in the proceedings."2 1
Carroll therefore plainly established that some attempt to notify the
named defendants must be made, but the opinion leaves three im-
portant questions unanswered. One is what quantum of effort must be
expended to notify the named injunction defendants of the pending
proceedings. A reasonable estimate of this quantity is readily available,
however, in those cases defining what steps must be taken to serve no.
209. If only "action" is being enjoined, then the only other First Amendment due
process requirement is that of an adversary hearing. See pp. 1024-25 infra.
210. See pp. 995-97 supra.
211. See pp. 1008-16 supra.
212. At most, a rule analogous to FED. R. Civ. P. 55(e) governing default judgments
against the United States might be constructed. Perhaps in cases where the injunction
defendants do not appear, the plaintiff who would censor expression should still be
required to establish his right to relief, including argumentation on First Amendment
protections, "by evidence satisfactory to the court."
213. 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
214. 393 U.S. at 177.
215. s93 U.S. at 180.
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tice of an injunction once issued. Actual, and not merely constructive
knowledge of the order is essential, but this knowledge need not be
imparted by personal service.2 10 In fact, notice has been deemed suffi-
cient when received by newspaper,217 bulletin board,218 and even word
of mouth.219 Accordingly, the techniques which have been used to serve
completed orders on students, such as personal service on John and
Jane Does numbered 1 through 100, posting notices on campus build-
ings, publication in school newspapers, and the use of public address
systems,220 should also suffice to comply with the Carroll demand that
an effort be made to notify a party of the proceedings pending against
him.221
A second problem in implementing Carroll can arise if there is no
easily identifiable group to enjoin at the time the order is requested.
In King v. Jones,22 2 for instance, a federal district court declined to hold
that Carroll extended to a TRO prohibiting demonstrations nearby a
courthouse on the theory that unlike the white supremacist party in
Carroll, here "there was no readily identifiable group... upon whom
service could be had."22 Because most campus demonstrations are
organized by some pre-existing group, be it SDS or an ad hoc strike
committee, the problem of having no defendants whatever to name and,
hence the need for the TRO to be granted ex parte, is slight, but even
where the administration can only name fictitious personalities, an
undesirable tactic to begin with,2 24 it should still be obliged to make
some effort to publicize the suit. Posting notices on campus buildings or
placing a prominent item in the school newspaper announcing the im-
216. See, e.g., People v. Saffell, 74 Cal. App. 2d 957, 168 P.2d 497 (App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1946). As stated in Cape May and Schellinger's Landing R.RL v. Johnson, 35 NJ. Eq.
422, 425 (Ch. 1882):
Notice, to be sufficient, need possess but two requisites-first, it must proceed from
a source entitled to credit, and, second, it must inform the defendant dearly and
plainly from what act he must abstain.
217. United Packing House Workers v. Boynton, 240 Iowa 212, 35 N.W.2d 831 (1949).
218. In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548 (1897).
219. Crucia v. Behrman, 147 La. 144, 84 So. 525 (1920).
220. Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. SDS, Columbia Univ. Chapter, No. 131A (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cty. June 10, 1969), reprinted in THE CAuPus Crisis REVisrrED, supra note 41, at 62.
221. Once a suitable effort to notify named parties is made, the Carroll requirement
is met, and the order may bind nonparties in the same manner as any injunction. See
note 181 supra and note 256 infra.
Similarly, if reasonable notice is given but the defendants do not appear, the ex parte
nature of an order, arising as it does from their waiver, would not invalidate the relief.
222. 319 F. Supp. 653 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
223. 319 F. Supp. at 656. The Court reached a similar result with respect to a portion
of the same ex parte TRO restraining witnesses from making public the testimony given
before a state grand jury investigating the disorders of last May at Kent State Uni.
versity. Both portions of the order were, however, struck down on other First Amendment
grounds.
224. See note 254 infra.
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pending litigation would not place an unreasonable burden on the
university administration and would enable those members of the
college community who felt threatened by the prospect of a TRO to
present their legal objections to the university's petition at a time when
their rights could be most effectively safeguarded. 2 5
The final unresolved issue implicit in Carroll involves demarcating
the set of situations in which an ex parte order is sought but Carroll
governs. Since the facts in Carroll were limited to a public rally well
within First Amendment confines, it has been thought distinguishable
from campus injunctions against non-First Amendment conduct. 20
This distinction is without merit. Since the very question of whether
the demonstration is "expression" and within the First Amendment
may be disputed, the protection afforded by an adversary proceeding
is crucial. Furthermore, the distinction is contrary to the reasoning in
Carroll. The Court, reflecting a growing distaste for ex parte TROs, 2T
derived the adversary requirement from the overbreadth doctrine as
follows:
[T]he order must be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact
needs of the case. The participation of both sides is necessary for
this purpose. Certainly, the failure to invite participation of the
party seeking to exercise First Amendment rights reduces the pos-
sibility of a narrowly drawn order, and substantially imperils the
protection which the Amendment seeks to assure,
-22 1
This diagnosis is all too accurate when applied to injunctions issued in
the midst of campus crises. Ex parte orders are the norm and adversary
225. A slight variation on this problem may occur if the university chooses not to
name all defendants who are identifiable. In such circumstances, an unnamed party may
seek representation. However, if the equitable and First Amendment principles as to
binding nonparties are observed, see note 181 supra, the problem vanishes, Since an In-
junctive plaintiff should be powerless to bind unnamed parties whose interests are not
adequately represented, such individuals or organizations may be denied representation.
226. The TRO in Carroll was said to be "plainly distinguishable" from the ex parte
order against violence and the threat of violence on the part of the November Action Co.
alition, a loose conglomerate of anti-war groups protesting military research at M.I.T.
November Action Coalition v. Johnson, Civil No. 69-1154-G (D. Mass. Nov. 4, 1969), Like-
wise, a state court in Board of Higher Educ. v. Marcus, 63 Misc. 2d 268, 311 N.Y.S.2d 579
(Sup. Ct., Kings County 1970), regarded Carroll as inapplicable to the activities of the
Brooklyn College Strike Steering Committee because it found the protest organized by the
Committee to include "an unlawful occupation, violence, the rights of others being vio.
lated and irreparable injury to plaintiff." Id. at 272; 311 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
227. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 330 (1967) (Warren, C.J. dis-
senting) ("The ex parte temporary injunction has a long and odious history in this
country . .. .'). For examples of the abusive use of ex parte orders to prohibit demonstra.
tions, see Brief for Appellants, at 30 n.15, Fields v. City of Fairfield, 375 U.S. 248 (1903).
Because the ex parte procedure provides no guarantee of the truth of the facts upon
which the order is based, abuse is inevitable. See Developments, note 27 supra, at 1060;
Note, Temporary Restraining Orders, 40 KY. L.J. 98 (1951).
228. 393 U.S. at 184.
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proceedings exceptional. 229 Often the judge simply signs the order as
it has been handed to him by the university's lawyers.20 They, in turn,
have been hard pressed to procure the order in time to forestall future
disturbances.231 In the process the order may have been hurriedly
drafted with little concern for precise language, perhaps grafting on
whole paragraphs from past injunctions issued in similar cases. 2- Given
these ineluctable pressures producing vague and overbroad TROs in
cases of student protest,2- Carroll should apply to all student demon-
strations both inside and outside the substantive coverage of the First
Amendment as previously defined.
Time Limits. Two of the Freedman rules reflected the Supreme
Court's concern over the possibility of protracted censorship proceed-
ings. The Court demanded "a specified brief period" for administrative
action2 4 as well as "a prompt final judicial decision."235 Although the
Freedman Court cautioned that different time limits for a judicial
determination might be acceptable in other contexts,20 the need for
expeditious review procedures for suppression of political protest is, if
anything, greater than that for motion picture censorship. Justice Har-
lan, in his concurring opinion in Shuttleworth v. City of Birming-
ham23 7 left no doubt as to this. Stressing the relevance of the Freedman
time limits to political demonstrations, he wrote:
The right to assemble peaceably to voice political protest is at
least as basic as the right to exhibit a motion picture which may
have some aesthetic value. Moreover, slow-moving procedures have
a much more severe impact in the instant case than they had in
Freedman. Though a movie exhibitor might suffer some financial
loss if he were obliged to wait a year or two while the administrative
and judicial mills ground out a result, it is nevertheless quite likely
that the public would ultimately see the film. In contrast, timing is
of the essence in politics; it is almost impossible to predict the
229. Universities in Washington, D.C., must attempt to serve notice under FED. R.
Crv. P. 65(a). Thus, an exception to the usual ex parte practice occurred in May 1970
when George Washington University sought, for the second time in as many )ears, a
TRO against a building occupation. Counsel for defendants came to the court from
the midst of dinner, contested the petition, and succeeded in modifying its language
slightly.
230. E.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. John Doe, No. 10795 (Super. Ct., Grafton
County, N.H. May 6, 1969).
231. Campus Confrontation, supra note 14, at 19; cf. note 12 supra.
232. Id.
233. Examples of vague and overbroad campus injunctions are indicated at p. 1017
supra.
234. 880 U.S. at 58-59.
235. 880 U.S. at 59.
236. 380 U.S. at 60-61.
287. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
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political future; and when an event occurs, it is often necessary to
have one's voice heard promptly, if it is to be considered at all. 3 8
The relevant time period in the injunctive process is that which runs
from the issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction to the final dis-
position on a motion for permanent injunction. The length of the
period may vary from days,239 to months,2 40 and even to years.241 When
delay of this magnitude is juxtaposed with the 19242 and 23 days 43
permitted for Freedman-type pendente lite restraints, it becomes clear
that the injunctive process does not comply with Freedman's pro-
cedural strictures as to time limits.
In fact, the time limit problem with respect to suppression of politi-
cal expression (national and campus, alike) is so critical that, except in
unusual circumstances, pendente lite relief should not be granted at all.
Recognizing the short span of time during which it may be possible to
organize the campus about a particular incident in order to effect con.
structive policy change, even the two and three week time limits ade-
quate for movie censorship are too long. If the university has had good
reason to anticipate enjoinable conduct, it should be required to pre-
sent its case on the merits at the outset, bearing the full burden of
proof necessary for a permanent injunction. In the event of disruption
so spontaneous that the university has had no opportunity to prepare
its case, but can show irreparable injury from protest properly subject
to injunction, temporary relief for the period-no more than a few
days-the university's counsel need to marshall the evidence and the
law to permit them to argue the justice of their cause in its entirety
might be granted.
238. 394 U.S. at 162-63. Justice Brennan expressed the same idea succinctly in the
dissenting opinion in Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), when he stated
"[t]he ability to exercise protected protest at a time when such exercise would be effec-
tive must be as protected as the beliefs themselves." Id. at 349 (Brennan, J. dissenting;
Warren, Ch. J., Douglas, J., Fortas, J. concurring).
289. A federal ex parte TRO, for example, cannot last for more than 10 days unless
extended for good cause. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 65(b).
240. In Board of Higher Educ. v. SDS, Queensborough Community College Chapter,
60 Misc. 2d 114, 300 N.Y.S.2d 983 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 1969), the interval between
issuing the TRO and granting the permanent injunction was 59 days. Campus Confron-
tation, supra note 14, at 5 n.20.
241. The ex parte anti-picketing order of a Pennsylvania court of common pleas in
Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1967) had been
continued indefinitely. Last year, anti-poverty workers campaigning for a school lunch
program unsuccessfully petitioned the federal courts to enjoin a school board from en-
forcing an ex parte TRO restraining their "trespassing upon the property of the Floyd
County Board of Education" that had been issued without a termination date by a
Kentucky court. Appalachian Volunteers Inc. v. Clark, 432 F.2d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 1970).
242. See note 203 supra.
243. Universal Film Exchange v. City of Chicago, 288 F. Supp. 286, 288-89 (N.D. 111.
1968).
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Assurance of a Final Hearing on the Merits. Finally, when a TRO or
temporary injunction to curtail protest is granted, it might seem that
demonstrators are given no assurance that a final decision on the merits
will ever be made, let alone be made promptly. Temporary relief gen-
erally suffices to meet the administration's needs,2"4 and permanent
injunctions are rarely sought.24 5 Nonetheless, if the foregoing safeguards
are observed, the philosophy underlying the code of procedure in Freed-
man-that the administrative official who would ban expression must
first obtain "a final judicial determination on the merits" 2-°-will have
been adequately incorporated into the injunctive process. -4v If the in-
junctive procedure ensures that a university prove in an adversary
proceeding that it faces irreparable injury from student protest which
is either outside the First Amendment or amenable to valid traffic
control regulation as to place, and if the court's decree does not exceed
a few days even in exceptional circumstances, then the procedure cannot
be said to jeopardize the First Amendment rights of the protestors. To
impose an additional constitutional requirement that the university
petition for permanent relief, especially if the campus has been restored
to relative tranquility, would be unnecessary and artificial.
III. The Efficacy of Injunctive Relief: An Assessment
Chairman Ichord, during his committee's hearings on SDS, com-
mented that "most university administrators have concluded the best
way to control campus disturbances is the injunction or temporary re-
straining order method."2 48 Administrators who have reached this con-
clusion base their judgment on factors other than the traditional
244. In other contexts, a few courts have refused to issue a temporary injunction
when to do so would give the plaintiff all the relief he could expect after a successful
trial on the merits. See Developments in Injunctions, supra note 27, at 1058. When the
cases may quickly become moot, as is often true of student protest, the full relief rule
may be justified. The best solution, as indicated in the discussion of time limits, is to
advance the trial on the merits. Id. at 1058-59.
245. An exception is the practice of the corporation counsel of New,' York City to
seek permanent injunctions in all cases on the theory that the decision in favor of
granting the TRO should be vindicated. See Campus Confrontation, supra note 14, at 5
n.22.
246. 380 US. at 59.
247. The basic premise of Freedman is also applicable to administrative regulation of
demonstrations, see authorities cited, note 204 supra, in the colleges and high schools,
see, e.g., Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 973 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Snyder v. Board of
Trustees, 286 F. Supp. 927, 936 (N.D. IIl. 1968). See also Iaskell, supra note 158, at 57;
Note, 119 U. PA. L REv. 512 (1971). But see Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., No. 35345
(2d Cir. Mar. 5, 1971); Kuszyski v. City of Oakland, 89 U.S.LW. 2487 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11,
1971).
248. Hearings on SDS, supra note 189, pt. 2, at 484.
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tests for equitable jurisdiction and a concern for the protection of
First Amendment freedoms. From the perspective of a beleaguered
administration quick recourse to the injunctive process may seem ad-
vantageous for a variety of purely strategic reasons. An authoritative
declaration that the conduct of the demonstrators is unlawful can help
gain community and student support for the administration's posi-
tion.249 It may forestall vigilante action on the part of those opposed to
the demonstrators. 25 0 Perhaps it will help insulate the university from
the second wave of disturbances which seek to coerce amnesty for stu-
dents arrested in earlier disruptions.261 If the order is obeyed, it may
avert the indiscriminate application of force and the open hostility
that so often accompany the presence of police on campus.2 52 Of course,
these appealing items must be balanced against certain legal complica-
tions which may attend the enforcement of an injunction on campus,
For example, difficulties may arise in binding nonparties, 2 3 serving the
249. ABA Report, supra note 24, at 27. The order may help the university ad.
ministration focus attention on the leaders of the disruption and their violent tactics,
Campus Confrontation, supra note 14, at 7-8.
250. By serving a court order the university proves it is not capitulating to the pro-
testors and reduces the incentive for counter-demonstrations. Campus Confrontation, supra
note 14, at 8. This factor played some role in the decision of Dartmouth College
to seek injunctive relief from a building seizure in 1969. Interview with Carroll Brewster,
Dean, Dartmouth College, Aug. 5, 1970, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
251. Campus Confrontation, supra note 14, at 8. It is generally thought that tile effect
arises from "[t]he shift in the role from complainant, as the university would appear in
a trespass action to that of fact finder, as it appears in the contempt action . . " Id. Tills
scenario is oversimplified. Although a constructive contempt, being an offense against
the state, should be prosecuted by an attorney for the state, e.g,, Peterson V. Peterson,
278 Minn. 275, 153 N.W.2d 825 (1967), the university is normally the party to initiate the
proceedings. Typically it serves an order on the defendants to show cause why they should
not be held in contempt, e.g., Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. SDS, No. 5637/69 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County April 30, 1969) (Order To Show Cause), reprinted in TnE CAMPtUS Ciusis
R1visrrao, supra note 41, at 50-52. This mode reflects the view that an injunction Is granted
as a dvil remedy for the benefit of the plaintiff who can, if he wishes, hold it in abey-
ance.
At the same time, university counsel show a keen appreciation for the fact that If they
consistently petition a court for injunctive relief but never enforce it, they will cause the
court to be reluctant to issue further orders on their behalf. For example, the Unl.
versity of Wisconsin has obtained two injunctions against protesting students but has
served neither. Their former counsel has indicated that should it be necessary to obtain
a third, the university will enforce it for fear that failure to do so would alienate the
court, if for no other reason. Bunn Interview, supra note 3. In addition, under one
theory violation of a decree is an affront to the court, and contempt, a vindication of
the court's authority. See, e.g., Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 824, 528 (1904),
quoting In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 458 (8th Cir. 1902). Accordingly, a court (or prosecutor)
on its own initiative may institute indirect contempt proceedings, e.g., Board of Junior
College District No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, No. 5246i
(Ill. App. June 26, 1970), 74 L.R.R.M. 2909, pet. for cert. filed sub norn. Cook County
College Teachers Union v. Swenson, 89 U.S.L.W. 3299 (U.S. Jan. 4, 1971). Cf. Regents of
Univ. of Colorado v. Fulks, Civil No. 26035 (Dist. Ct. Boulder County, Colo. Apr. 20, 1969)
(Modified TRO).
252. See pp. 1006-07 supra.
258. See note 181 supra. Furthermore, even if the class action approach is pursued
and a proper class named, formidable problems in establishing membership in the
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order,254 and acquiring jurisdiction over juveniles.2, In addition, the
limited and confused character of the defenses available to alleged
contemnors may place the injunction defendants in an unfair posi-
tion.2
56
class may be present. Injunctions like those obtained by M.LT. against the November
Action Coalition, Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. Hahnel, No. 30407 (Super.
Ct., Middlesex Cty. Nov. 3, 1969), or by Columbia University against the December 4th
Movement, Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. December 4th Movement, No. 4340/1970 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County, N.Y. Mar. 19, 1970) (Order to Show Cause), although they do name
acceptable classes, are aimed at "the most ephemeral organizations on the face of the
earth," Hearings on Riots, supra note 12, pt. 21, at 4588 (testimony of Dr. Richard Ly-
man, Vice President and Provost, Stanford University), In addition, those schools which
have refused to allow SDS chapters to form on campus, such as the University of Florida,
Hearings on SDS, supra note 189, pt. 1, at 11, and Florida State University, Lieberman
v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120, 123 (Fla. 1970), those that have effectively discouraged chapters
from organizing, such as Georgetown University, Hearings on SDS, supra, pt. 1-B, at M45,
and those that have outlawed existing units, such as Kent State University, Pnsw~rs
CO~M'N, supra note 2, at 236, face an even more fundamental obstade in utilizing the
class action technique.
254. The methods for serving the orders employed by universities are usually legally
sufficient, see p. 1023 supra, but there is a real possibility that the defendants will
refuse to accept service. For example, at one point the University of Wisconsin, having
secured a TRO, was unable even to find the students named as defendants. Bunn Inter-
view, supra note 3. After the Pennsylvania State University computer center take-over, a
federal court reviewing disciplinary proceedings commented "[tihe noise and confusion
from the crowd and the interference from the squeal of a public address system used by
one of the students was so great that the reading of the injunction was unintelligible to
those who were in a position to hear it and inaudible to most of those in the building."
Sill v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 318 F. Supp. 608, 612 (M.D. Pa. 1970). Cf. Rosenthal,
supra note 19, at 760. Certainly, the refusal to accept service is no legal obstacle to a
contempt conviction in view of the numerous cases holding service of process to be
sufficient if the attempt to serve is made but the physical failure to complete is due to
the refusal of the individual to accept the papers. See cases cited, Rosenthal, supra, at 761
n.74. However, the resentment the John Doe technique generates is a more funda-
mental problem. For this reason a few schools will ser-e only known individuals and
organizations. Interview with John Cantini, Vice President for Administration, George
Washington University, July 28, 1970, on file with the Yale Law Journal.
255. For instance, of the five students who violated the 1969 TRO at George Washing
ton University, one was a juvenile and therefore not charged with contempt. Hearings
on SDS, sup a note 189, pt. 3-A, at 680.
256. Excluding questions of identification, the only possible defenses are constitu-
tional and jurisdictional. See CHAFEE, supra note 16, at 296-380; Blasi, supra note 82,
at 1555-67. On the jurisdictional issue, although actual knowledge of the order
must be proved for a defendant to be held in contempt, see p. 1023 supra, and al-
though certain persons cannot be held in contempt even with knowledge, see note 181
supra, if the university makes a strong effort to publicize the injunction, a court will
probably be willing to impose contempt sentences in the absence of individualized evi-
dence of actual knowledge. Thus, in the third Columbia incident of 1969, see note 261
infra, the state court held that:
[Mhe defendants had knowledge of the terms and conditions of the restraining order
of April 19, 1969. Not only was service made personally upon some of the defen-
dants but the campus was saturated with newspaper, radio, pamphlet distribution,
conversation, pronouncements and oratory and the injunctive order was headline
news of the first magnitude.
Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. SDS, Columbia Univ. Chapter, No. 131A (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County June 10, 1969), reprinted in CAwus Casms Rrvxsrrm supra note 41, at 62, 64.
As for constitutional defenses, perhaps the alembic of future decisions will bring
order into the chaotic world of Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), and the intervening cases. See general!y Blasi, supra, at
1555-57; CHAM, supra, at 296-380. But as they now stand, these decisions force on dis.
sident students who feel that any portion of the TRO issued against them is substantively
improper, a difficult choice. They must delay their proscribed activities until their legal
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Thus if injunctions are framed in the light of the equitable and
constitutional principles described earlier, their use on campus presents
tactical rather than legal problems. Of all the strategic considerations
that have been outlined, the most important by far is the hope that
voluntary compliance with the injunction will avoid the prospect of
the campus' being turned into an exercise in riot control. Inversely,
the gravest problem with the use of the injunctive process is that posed
by the spectre of widespread defiance of court orders. Accordingly, ad-
vocates of the campus injunction point out that many of the early
orders issued to terminate building seizures were successful in clear-
ing the buildings without resort to police;257 in the words of one ad-
ministrator, the use of injunctions has had "a great tranquilizing ef-
fect." 258 Yet, unqualified success has not been forthcoming,10 and the
prospects for continued voluntary compliance are diminishing.
challenge is complete or face an almost certain contempt citation. While injection of the
procedural safeguards of Freedman v. Maryland into the injunctive regulation of dem-
onstrations, see pp. 1019-27 supra, would ameliorate the severity of the problem, the
same difficulties exist in somewhat attenuated form in injunctions banning protest not
strictly within First Amendment confines. See Campus Confrontations, supra note 14,
at 9.
257. A survey conducted by the National Association of College and University At-
torneys in 1969 revealed that of the 22 instances in which universities reported seeking
injunctions:
Voluntary compliance to court order was obtained within hours in fourteen cases
(including three in City University of New York), in days for one institution. In one
case compliance was obtained in minutes and before orders could be processed.
In five cases the court order was not obeyed and enforcement was sought in the
form of contempt citation. In another ... case the question was not answered . . ..
In all cases enforcement orders were obtained without difficulty. Voluntary com-
pliance was normally obtained ....
Nat'l Ass'n of College and University Attorneys, Report to the American Council of Eda.
cation on the Use of Injunction Against Campus Disorders, 4 CoLLro CouNsEL 1, 5
(1969) [hereinafter cited as NACUA]. See also Pmmrrr's COMm'N, supra note 2, at
140; Hearings on SDS, supra note 189, pt. 1-A, at 47; Hearings on Riots, supra note 12, pt.
21, at 4542.
258. Cantini Interview, supra note 253.
259. In several cases large numbers of students have simply flaunted the order. At
least 56 of the original 150-200 students occupying Dartmouth's administration building
in 1969 had to be forcibly removed and were later convicted of contempt and sentenced
to thirty days imprisonment. Brewster Interview, supra note 250; Herman, supra note 18,
at 224. At Florida State University 58 were arrested when they refused to leave the
prohibited SDS meeting in the student union after the TRO was read to them, Lieber-
man v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120, 124 (Fla. 1970). Likewise, many students remained In a
building at Pennsylvania State University despite warnings, and fifteen state policemen
were injured in enforcing the injunction. Sill v. Pennsylvania State University, 318 F.
Supp. 608, 612 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (no report of injuries to students given by court). At
Boston University six students were sentenced to three months in jail for contempt of an
order directing them to vacate a university building. Herman, supra, at 230. Finally the
most tragic example of the complete futility of injunctive control is provided by the
events at Kent State University in May 1970. See PmsDmT's CoUNI', supra note 2, at 245.
Sometimes when the incident covered by the injunction is resolved without police
force, the value of the injunction is nevertheless illusory in that police are called in to
deal with a related event anyway. For instance, in December 1969 the University of
Wisconsin obtained an order against disruption of classes. Although the Injunction
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The probability that a court order will be complied with voluntarily
is a function of at least three variables. First, thus far, injunctive relief
is an extraordinary remedy, imbued with more judicial majesty than a
riot stick can command. In this respect its use, as one radical group
pointed out, is "psychological warfare." 260 If so, as the novelty of the
invocation of injunctions wears off at particular campuses, prospects
for voluntary compliance will dwindle. Already, at those institutions
where multiple resort to injunctive relief has been had, growing num-
bers of students have become increasingly less cooperative with the
process. 2 Apparently, "[y]oung blood doth not obey an old decree."2 0a
Second, for the injunction defendants the order is a specific weapon
pointing directly at them.e This factor has its maximum impact on
was itself obeyed, the unrest terminated in a march on the ROTC building and a fight
with police at that point. Bunn Interview, supra note S. During the November 4th pro-
test at IT, where it was felt that the few instances of violence arguably in violation of
the TRO were not suffidently serious to demand contempt proceedings, police were
nevertheless used to dear entrances on city streets to some laboratories. Letter from
Kevin Hem to author, at 3, Aug. 14, 1970, on file with the Yale Law Journal. Similarly,
limited use of police was made despite deployment of TROs at C.U.N.Y., Board of Higher
Educ. v. Rubain, 62 Misc. 2d 978, 310 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1970), and at
Brooklyn College, Board of Higher Educ. v. Marcus, 63 Misc. 2d 268, 311 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1970).
Finall, as with several of the instances reported to NACUA, note 257 supra, police
had to be called onto campus shortly before the inddent covered by the injunction, t
that the voluntary compliance was of reduced strategic value.
260. K. BoumDN et al., TBE BUST BOOK: WHAT To Do UrNTL Tim LAwym Commrs 81
(1969). Jack Greenberg, director of the N.A.AC.P. Legal Defense Fund, has attributed
much of the effectiveness of the injunction to "the mystique of the courts." See Herman,
supra note 18, at 229. This factor should be most persuasive with "moderates" whose re-
spect for the judiciary exceeds that possessed by "radicals," cf. Campus Confrontation,
supra note 14, at 12, but even the seasoned dissident may pause at the fact that it is the
court that is ordering him out of a building or to refrain from violence. For example,
after the third building seizure at Columbia in 1969, see note 261 infra, an SDS leader
was asked in a university radio interview why the demonstrators finally left before
the arrival of the police. He replied:
Well, the injunction escalates the risk of conducting a sit-in. It is no longer a ques-
tion of simply violating university rules, or even being subjected to charges of
criminal trespass, which may be later withdrawn. It brings us into confrontation
with the court.
STMMErr PRoTsrr, supra note 2, at 154.
261. The 1969 experience of Howard University is instructive. On February 18, law
students occupied the law building but left in the face of an injunction. On March 11,
various students occupied the President's Office and the New Classroom Building; they
left peaceably following the issuance of a TRO. On May 8, about five buildings were
seized, and, once again, an injunction secured. This time a contempt citation had to
be issued, and 100 federal marshals moved onto the campus, making arrests. Hearings on
Riots, supra note 12 pt. 22, at 4678 & 4773. See also In re Anderson, 306 F. Supp. 712
(D.D.C. 1969). The same trend was evident at Columbia University that same I-ear. See
STuDENT PROTEST, supra note 2, at 153-5-. Similarly, a 1968 order at George Washington
University to terminate a building seizure proved eminently successful, but one the
following year resulted in five arrests and four contempt convictions. See Hearings on SDS,
supra note 189, pt. 3-A, at 680.
262. Love's Labours Lost IV, iii, 218.
263. As BoutnN et al., supra note 260, put it
Criminal laws are not directed at any one person or any one situatlon. An injunction,
however, is directed at specific people in a specific situation. This makes us feel
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those named in the order, and by dearly announcing what activity is
intolerable, has a secondary effect on those not named. Nonetheless,
the possibility that an injunction defendant will risk a contempt cita-
tion is by no means chimeric. Many protesting student groups have
excellent legal advice, and, as further use of the injunction is made,
these students will be informed of differences between state injunction
statutes and criminal laws.2 64 When they realize that with the recent
barrage of criminal statutes trained on the campus 268 a contempt con-
viction will often result in a sentence less severe than that imposed for
a criminal violation,266 they will be less hesitant to defy a court's author-
ity.
Third, to the extent that students perceive the administration's use
of the injunction as "illegitimate, '267 they will be disinclined to honor
it. From the standpoint of the demonstrators, the injunctive process is
but a judicial subterfuge purporting to resolve the crisis but avoiding
the underlying issues; the court acts as a lackey of the university, at-
tempting to legitimize the administration's inaction or rejection of the
protestors' grievances.2 68 If the university repeatedly seeks the aid of
the courts, especially in instances where the complaints voiced by the
dissenting students have substantial support among the campus com-
munity, this analysis is likely to prevail among more moderate students
as well. Therefore, rather than "tranquilizing" students, interposition
more threatened; we feel as if we've been singled out by the court and there will be
no escape if we in any way violate the injunction.
See also Herman, supra note 18, at 229.
264. This educational process is already underway:
When first used, many of us feared that contempt meant arrest at any time, jail
without a trial, and no right to bail or appeal. In fact, contempt proceedings are,
alternatively, no worse for us than regular criminal trials.
BotmIN et al., supra note 260, at 82-83.
265. See note 25 supra.
266. Sentences and fines for violating an injunction vary from state to state. Sce, e.g.,
N.Y. JUDICIAL LAw 751 (McKinney 1968) ($250 and/or 50 days); 17 PA. STAT. ANN. 2018
(1930) ($100 and/or 15 days); 84 ARK. STAT. ANN. 902 (1947); ($50 and/or ten days); 9 ALA9.
STAT. 09.50.020 (1956) ($300 or 6 mo.); Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. 12-863 (1956) ($1000 atnd/or 6
Mo.); CAL. CtV. PRoc. 1218 (West 1955) ($500 and/or 5 days).
It is, however, possible that the same act may be punished as both a crime and a con-
tempt, see note 29 supra; Herman, supra note 18, at 231 (reporting multip I prosecutions
arising from Columbia University incidents), but students will probably be advised that
such double prosecution is unlikely in most cases, Campus Confrontations, supra note 14,
at 12. In the Dartmouth case, for example, see note 259 supra, ACLU lawyers advised
the offending students that if they remained in the administration building, thirty day
sentences would be forthcoming. Brewster Interview, supra note 250. Their prediction
was correct and no other criminal charges were brought.
267. In employing this term, the distinction drawn by Professors Graham and Gurr
between "legality" and "legitimacy" is assumed. See H. GRAfr & T. GVm, VIOLENCE IN
AMEICA: IsToRicAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES xiv-xv (Staff Report to Nat'l Comin'n
on the Causes and Prevention of Violence No. 1, 1969),
268. See Campus Confrontation, supra note 14, at 10.
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of the court may polarize resistance to university discipline and gen-
erate animosity toward the judiciary.20c If demands for vague and over-
broad orders persist, and if improper resort to the injunction is made
for the purpose of restraining First Amendment freedoms, it may, as
the ABA cautioned, "result in lower court denials or appellate court
reversals embarrassing to the university, and may contribute to the
arguments of dissidents that the university does not respect basic
constitutional rights."270
For such reasons one administrator recently expressed the fear that
if the proliferation of campus injunctions continues unchecked, in a
year or so the tactic will no longer be potent in inducing voluntary
compliance.2U Although this prognosis may be overly pessimistic,
slogans like the one in vogue at George Washington University in 1970
-LIFT THE RESTRAINING ORDER NOW! JOIN US127"-will
undoubtedly attract more adherents in the coming years.
To summarize, it would be a serious mistake to believe that injunc-
tive control will automatically defuse a campus crisis. Whatever their
constitutional and equitable merits, the success of injunctions in dis-
lodging students from barricaded buildings and curtailing other mili-
tant tactics has varied considerably, sometimes effecting immediate
compliance and, increasingly, evoking mass defiance. Considering the
three major factors which appear to influence the efficacy of injunctive
relief, three parallel principles should guide its deployment. First, if
familiarity is not to breed contempt, relief should be sought spar-
ingly,2 73 and reserved for major confrontations in which seriously dis-
ruptive conduct well beyond the limits of the First Amendment has
already occurred.274 Second, it should not be used prospectively, as a
269. Cf. ABA Report, supra note 24, at 28.
270. Id.
271. Cantini Interviev, supra note 254.
272. Hearings on SDS, supra note 189, pt. -B, at 1025.
273. PgRsmENT'S Co.ss'N, supra note 2, at 141. The National Association of College
and University Attorneys went so far as to recommend that injunctions be used only when
the demonstrators are seeking an "excuse" to end the protest. NACUA, supra note 257, at
9; Cf. ABA Report, supra note 24, at 27; THE CAS!Pus Crisis Rnvisrra, supra note 41, at 15.
274. The stated policy of Columbia University embodies this idea. According to their
counsel:
In the fall of 1968 we at Columbia made a policy decision not to e recourse to an
injunction for frivolous reasons, but to reserve it for an activity so serious as to
create an imminent peril of widespread disruption or interference with university
activities. Having made that decision we also decided that even when such con-.
duct was imminent we would not seek an injunction antidipatorily. but would wait
until there had been an occurrence. An advantage of this approach is that when
the institution does seek an injunction the campus knows it is necessary and that it
is not intended as a menacing or restrictive ploy.
SruinNr Paorzsr, supra note 12, at 152.
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prior restraint on protest,275 but should be restricted to ongoing, un-
protected, disruptive actions. Finally, it should be obtained only when
the rallying potential of the issues advocated by the demonstrators is
small.276 Otherwise, if these admonitions are ignored and the device
displayed too frequently, campus injunctions will be flaunted by stu-
dents, police or patience will be necessary to weather the crisis, respect
for the administrations' positions will have been undermined, and the
moral force of the courts, squandered.
275. Not only are constitutional infirmities almost certain to afflict an injunction
used as a prior restraint, see pp. 1000-19 supra, but the probability that the order will
be perceived by the campus community as repressing legitimate protest is considerably
enhanced by the fact that it forbids future expression.
276. Cf. Campus Confrontation, supnra note 14, at 13.
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